Paul Howard Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Association : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Paul Howard Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home
Association : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Edwin C. Barnes; Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson; Attorney for Defendant/Appellee.
Boyd Kimball Dyer; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Paul Howard Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Association, No. 200430396 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5472
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAUL HOWARD PETERS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
PINE MEADOW RANCH HOME 
ASSOCIATION (also known as 
PINE MEADOW RANCH HOME 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION and as 
PINE MEADOW RANCH 
ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant/Appellee 
ON APPEAL FROM THE 
UTAH THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
-SUMMIT COUNTY-
The Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
Appellate Case. No. 200430396 - CA 
Trial Court Case No. 990600413 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
50 
.A10 
POCKET NO. 7rGWZ°^(e-&± 
Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. (No. 217) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 - 2216 
Boyd Kimball Dyer, Esq. (No. 944) 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
664 Northcliffe Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
U T A H A P pELUTE COURTS 
AUG J 0 2004 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAUL HOWARD PETERS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. , 
PINE MEADOW RANCH HOME ; 
ASSOCIATION (also known as ; 
PINE MEADOW RANCH HOME ; 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION and as ; 
PINE MEADOW RANCH ) 
ASSOCIATION, ) 
Defendant/Appellee ) 
) ON APPEAL FROM THE 
) UTAH THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
) - SUMMIT COUNTY -
) The Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck 
) APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
) Appellate Case. No. 200430396 - CA 
) Trial Court Case No. 990600413 
Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. (No. 217) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 - 2216 
Boyd Kimball Dyer, Esq. (No. 944) 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
664 Northcliffe Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
PARTIES 
The caption of the case contains the names of all the parties. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 6 
JURISDICTION 7 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 7 
CITATIONS TO THE RECORD SHOWING ISSUES PRESERVED 9 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 9 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 10 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 19 
ARGUMENTS 22 
1. Descriptio personae applies because (1) there is no evidence 22 
contemporaneous with the 1965 Bates Deed that a trust actually existed, 
(2) Pine Meadows Ranch, Inc. ("PMRI") could not have been the beneficiary 
of the trust in 1965 because it did not exist until 1973, and (3) the extrinsic 
evidence of the plat does not prove that a trust actually existed. 
2. Assuming it was a trust beneficiary, PMRI was not in "privity 29 
of estate" for purposes of covenants running with the land because 
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Security Title owned the land in fee simple estate. 
3. PMRI was (1) not in "mutual privity" because the covenants 33 
did not arise from a transaction between it and a mutual owner of the 
same parcel of land, (2) not in "horizontal privity" because it didiiot 
convey the land to a person who agreed to be bound by the covenants, 
and (3) not in "vertical privity" because it did not convey land to Plaintiff/ 
Appellant's predecessor in interest. 
4. The holding of this Court in Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower 36 
Mountain Fonds (that inferences drawn from recorded documents are no 
substitute for a recorded deed), applies in this case because the Utah 
Statute of Frauds and the Utah Recording Act make no distinction 
between title and other interests in real property. 
5. Under the Utah general law of trusts, the beneficiary does not 39 
have the power to encumber or otherwise dispose of the assets held by 
the trustee. 
6. The 1973 CC&R's are unenforceable under the doctrine of 43 
uniformity because they only cover Pine Meadow Ranch Plat D, and 
not the rest of the 1,200 acres that they purport to cover. 
7. The trial court was mistaken in concluding that "Plaintiffs 44 
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predecessors in interest" had agreed to the 1973 CC&R's, and even 
if one of them had so agreed, that agreement would be unenforceable 
under the Utah Statute of Frauds and void under the Utah Recording Act. 
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15. The Trial Court's Ruling and Order of March 22, 2004 in the companion 
case, Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Ass'n, L.L.C. v. 
Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass 'n, Appellate Case No. 200430397 - CA. 
[This Ruling and Order appears in the record of the companion case at 
R00366-382]. 
16. 1980 Notice of Lien, R0232. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. sec. 78 -
2 - 2 (3) (j) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Under the doctrine of descriptio personae, if the word "trustee" appears 
after the name of the grantee in a deed conveying approximately 4,264.68 acres 
and there is no contemporaneous evidence that a trust actually existed, but there is 
extrinsic evidence that - (1) eight years after the deed, a new corporation was 
formed, (2) that new corporation executed and recorded covenants, conditions and 
restrictions ("CC&R's) against about a quarter of the real property conveyed by 
the earlier deed, (3) in the CC&R's, the new corporation declares that it "is the 
owner of or intends to acquire" the property covered by the CC&R's, (4) in the 
CC&R's there is no reference to a trust or trust beneficiary, (5) three years later 
the new corporation signed the "owner's dedication" on a subdivision plat partly 
7 
located in the area purportedly covered by the CC&R's, and (6) a note on that plat 
refers to the corporation as the "subdivider" and as owning and being responsible 
for the maintenance of the streets - as a matter of law, is that corporation the 
beneficiary of a trust of which the trust res was the 4,264.68 acres? 
2. Under the Utah judicial requirements for covenants to run with the land, 
is there "privity of estate" between the beneficiary of a trust and the grantee of the 
trustee of that trust with respect to lots carved out of the real property which was 
the trust res? 
3. Under Utah general law of trusts, does a trust beneficiary have the power 
to dispose of the real property held by the trustee for his benefit in the trust (as 
opposed to his beneficial interest in the trust)? 
4. Under the Utah doctrine of uniformity, are CC&R's that bind only part of 
the area they purport to cover binding at all? 
5. Does contract law provide an alternative way to create legally 
enforceable CC&R's without the formalities of written documents, signatures, 
notarial acknowledgments and recordation? 
Standard of Review: This is an appeal from the granting and denial of 
cross motions for summary judgment. In this situation, the standard of review is 
to review the issues of law for correctness with no deference to the trial court, 
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Grynberg v. Questar Pipleline Co., 2002 UT 8, para. 20, 70 P.3d 1, 6; Surety 
Underwriters v.E&C Trucking, Inc. , 2000 UT 71, para. 14, 10 P.3d 338, 340. 
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING ISSUES WERE PRESERVED 
1. "Descriptio Personae". In the record of Forest Meadows, R00378 
("Ruling and Order"). 
2. Privity of Estate. In the record of Forest Meadows, R00379 ("Ruling 
and Order"). 
3. Power of a Trust Beneficiary to Deal with Trust Assets. In the record of 
Forest Meadows, R0378. 
4. Uniformity. R0426-451 ("Mem. in Supp. 2d Mo. for S.J."). 
5. Use of Contract Law to Create Enforceable CC&R's. R0419 ("Ruling 
and Order"). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 25 - 5 - 1 ("Utah Statute of Frauds.") 
"No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not 
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property 
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by 
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, 
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized in writing." 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 57-1 - 12 ("Form of warranty deed - Effect.") 
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a. 
A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall have the 
effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of 
the premises therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights, and 
privileges thereunto belonging, . . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 5 7 - 3 - 1 0 3 ("Effect of failure to record.") 
"Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and 
for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff originally brought this action as the petitioner in a summary 
proceeding under the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute, Utah Code Ann. see's. 
38 - 9 - 1 et seq.. ROOOl. The trial court dismissed the summary proceeding with 
prejudice, but permitted the action to proceed as an action to quiet title under Utah 
Code Ann. sec. 7 8 - 4 0 - 1 . R0149. In the quiet title action, Plaintiff claims that 
two recorded documents, identified in this action as "the 1973 CC&R's" and "the 
1980 Notice of Lien," are invalid clouds on his title (in effect, wrongful liens) on 
his Lot 6 in Pine Meadow Ranch Plat D, Summit County, Utah. R0157-164. 
The background of this action is: 
On October 14, 1965, F.E. Bates and his wife Mae P. Bates deeded a large 
10 
tract of land in Summit County, approximately 4,264.68 acres, by warranty deed to 
"Security Title Company, Trustee, a corporation of Utah." There is no 
contemporaneous evidence that a trust actually existed or, if a trust did exist, of 
who its beneficiary was. A copy of the 1965 Bates deed is Document " 1 " in the 
Addendum. R0202. 
Eight years later, on August 15, 1973, W. Brent Jensen, purporting to act as 
the president of 'Tine Meadow Ranch " executed and acknowledged in corporate 
form a "Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions" ("CC&R's) for 
part of the area covered by the 1965 Bates Deed (approximately 1,200 acres out of 
approximately 4,264.68.) These 1973 CC&R's were recorded on September 28, 
1973. A copy of the 1973 CC&R's is Document "3" in the Addendum. R0221-
230. 
At the time Mr. Jensen executed the 1973 CC&R's (August 15, 1973), Pine 
Meadow Ranch, Inc., ("PMRI") did not exist. It was incorporated on August 22, 
1973. A copy of the first page of its Articles of Incorporation is Document "2" in 
the Addendum. R0358. There is a letter in the file from the Utah Department of 
Commerce showing that Mr. Jensen had been using "Pine Meadow Ranch" 
previously as a trade name. R0362. 
In the 1973 CC&R's, Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., ("PMRI") declares: 
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"WHEREAS declarant is the owner of or intends to acquire certain property 
in Summit County, State of Utah, which is more particularly described as: 
The South one-half of section 16; the East half of the Southeast 
quarter of Section 17; the East half of the East half of Section 20; All 
of Section 21; all in Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian (containing approximately l,200acres)^-R0221. 
There is no mention of a trust in the declaration and PMRI does not describe itself 
as the beneficiary of a trust. PMRI does not declare that it owns the property in 
question or that it has a beneficial interest in it but that it "is the owner of or 
intends to acquire" the property. PMRI actually declares its non-ownership, and 
nothing in the real estate records shows that it later acquired ownership of the 
property described in the declaration. 
The declaration covers only roughly 1,200 acres of the 4,264.68 acres 
covered by the 1965 Bates Deed. Most importantly, by including "all of Section 
21" in this declaration, PMRI is purporting to impose the 1973 CC&R's on the 
western portion of Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D (the subdivision involved in the 
companion case). But, in the companion case, Forest Meadows Property Owners 
Ass'n, etc., the trial court ruled, based on the evidence of the Plat for Forest 
Meadow Ranch Plat D, that this same land was owned by Security Title Company 
as trustee for the benefit of Deseret Diversified Development, a corporation 
formed in 1971. A copy of the trial court's ruling and order is Document "15" in 
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the Addendum. The inconsistency is glaring. 
On May 6, 1976, "Pine Meadow Ranch Plat 'D'" was recorded at the 
Summit County Recorder's office. R0204-205. The "Owner's Dedication" on the 
plat reads as follows: 
"OWNER'S DEDICATION 
"Know all men by these presents that , the undersigned owner 
( ) of the above described tract of land, having caused the same to be subdivided 
into lots and streets to be hereafter known as the 
PINE MEADOW RANCH. PLAT "D" 
do hereby dedicate for perpetual use of the public all parcels of land shown on this 
plat as intended for public use. 
"In witness whereof have hereunto set this 
day of ,A.D. 19 
PINE MEADOW RANCH 
/s/ W. Brent Jensen 1st Zella J. Jensen 
Wesley Brent Jensen Zella J. Jensen 
President Secretary 
SECURITY TITLE CO., TRUSTEE 
/s/ Gordon H. Dick I si Nancy H. Barlette 
Exec Vice President Asst, Secretary" 
The following "Subdividers Note" appears on the plat: 
"SUBDIVIDERS NOTE 
"The recording of this plat shall not constitute a dedication of roads and 
streets or rights of way to public. It is intended that alia streets shown hereon shall 
remain the property of the subdivider, Pine Meadow Ranch, and shall be 
completely maintained by said owner. 
13 
/s/ W. Brent Jensen 
W. Brent Jensen" 
In this "Subdivided s Note," the omission of the word "Inc." in the name 
"Pine Meadows Ranch" and the personal form of signature ("W. Brent Jensen" as 
opposed to "Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., by W. Brent Jensen, president77) combined 
with the fact that Mr. W. Brent Jensen was using "Pine Meadow Ranch" as his 
personal dba, R0362, mean that the note on its face refers to Mr. Jensen personally 
and not to PMRI, the corporation. 
Nothing on the plat makes reference to a trust and PMRI does not describe 
itself as the beneficiary of a trust. Nor does Mr. W. Brent Jensen describe himself 
as the beneficiary of a trust. The plat contains no language of conveyance by 
which Security Title conveys anything to PMRI or Mr. W. Brent Jensen. 
On December 31, 1979, PMRI was dissolved for failing to file its annual 
report. R0381-383. 
After the recordation of the plat created the lots, the history of Lot 6 is as 
follows: 
(1) On July 7, 1977, Security Title Company, Trustee, conveyed Lot 6, Pine 
Meadow Ranch Plat "D," to Mountainland Properties, Inc., by special warranty 
deed, recorded July 15, 1997. Document "9" in the Addendum. R0207. 
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(2) On August 4, 1980, Mountainland Properties, Inc., conveyed Lot 6 to 
John F. Ryan by special warranty deed, recorded August 5, 1980. Document "11" 
in the Addendum. R0209. 
(3) On October 24, 1984, John Ryan and his wife, Walleen-Ryan, conveyed 
Lot 6 by warranty deed to Mountainland Properties, Inc., recorded October 29, 
1984. Document "12" in the Addendum. R0211. 
(4) On October 25, 1984, Mountainland Properties conveyed Lot 6 by 
special warranty deed to Raymond R. Blanchard, recorded March 29, 1985. 
Document "13" in the Addendum. R0213. 
(5) On January 19, 1999, Raymond R. Blanchard conveyed Lot 6 by 
warranty deeded to Plaintiff, Paul H. Peters, recorded January 20, 1999. 
Document "14" in the Addendum. R0215. 
PMRI does not appear in this chain of title. There is no deed, contract, or 
other document in the record whereby anyone in the chain of title agrees to impose 
thel973CC&R'sonLot6. 
On July 25, 1980, Defendant recorded against Lot 6 a "Notice of Lien" by 
which it gave notice that it claimed liens against Lot 6 under the 1973 CC&R's 
"for the payment of annual maintenance assessment, annual water share fees, 
special maintenance assessments, penalties and interest on any or all of said items" 
15 
("1980 Notice of Lien."). R0232. 
On November 4, 1987, Pine Meadow Ranch Plats E, F, G and I were 
recorded, with the following persons signing the "Owner's Dedication" in those 
plats: 
Plat E Security Title Company Trustee by Craig F. Thomson, 
Pres. and Charles G. Miller, Sec. 
C. Mike Nielson 
Earl Clayton and Margaret Clayton 
Plat F Security Title Company, Trustee by Craig F. Thomson, 
pres. and Charles G. Miller, sec. 
Herbert Rij and Renate Rij 
Plat G Security Title Company, Trustee by Craig F. Thomson, 
pres and Charles G. Miller, sec. 
Max E. Bangerter 
Howells, Inc. by Bobby G. Waggoner, vice pres. 
Larry LeRoy Smith and Sybil Burton Smith 
Plat I Security Title Company, Trustee by Craig F. Thomson, 
pres., and Charles A. Miller, sec. 
Plats E, F, and G (but not I) contain "Road Dedication Notes" that read as 
follows: 
"Road Dedication Notes 
"The owners hereof hereby acknowledge the judgment of the Court in Case 
Number 6181 in the District Court for Summit County as to certain private surface 
rights of passage over the road depicted on the foregoing plat and that Summit 
County has no responsibility for improvement or maintenance of such roads; 
provided however that title to the surface easement and subsurface of the roads 
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depicted for this plat is held by the Pine Meadow Ranch Owners Association for 
conveyance and sale in the future to be maintained by the Pine Meadow Special 
Service District." 
There is no language of conveyance on the plats conveying any interest in 
the roads to Defendant Pine Meadow Ranch Owners Association.—PMRI had been 
dissolved on December 31, 1979, eight years before the recordation of these plats. 
On December 1, 1999, Plaintiff brought this action as Petitioner under the 
Utah Wrongful Lien Statute to have the 1973 CC&R's and the 1980 Notice of 
Lien declared wrongful liens under the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute. The trial 
court dismissed the petition with prejudice, but allowed the action to proceed as a 
quiet title action. This is why Plaintiff is "Plaintiff and not "Petitioner." 
In the spring of 2000, the Special Service District in the area that had been 
maintaining the roads with taxes collected from district property owners was 
dissolved. Defendant then for the first time began to make assessments against the 
lots in the Pine Meadows Ranch and the Forest Meadow Ranch subdivisions. 
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment based on the fact that PMRI 
did not have any interest of record in the land when it recorded the 1973 CC&R's.1 
1
 Plaintiff concedes that since PMRI was incorporated on August 22, 1973, 
and it recorded the 1973 CC&R's on September 28, 1973, five weeks later, PMRI 
"adopted" the 1973 CC&R's and the fact that it did not exist when Mr. W. Brent 
Jensen signed the 1973 CC&R's does not mean they are invalid. 
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Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the grounds that PMRI 
was the beneficiary of a trust in which Security Title held the land covered by the 
1973 CC&R's as trustee for its benefit, and, as the beneficiary, had the power to 
bind the land with covenants running with the land. 
The trial court, the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck, denied Plaintiffs motion 
and granted Defendant's cross motion. In the trial court's ruling and order, the 
judge makes reference to his Ruling and Order in the companion case, Forest 
Meadow Property Owners Ass'n, etc. A copy of that ruling and order is included 
as Document "15" in the Addendum. 
Plaintiff then brought a second motion for summary judgment based on the 
doctrine of uniformity - that CC&R's are unenforceable if they do not apply in a 
reasonably uniform manner. R0424-425. Plaintiff argued that if the note and 
owner's dedication on Plat D make PMRI the trust beneficiary, then the notes and 
owner's dedications on plats E, F, G and I make other people the trust 
beneficiaries too, and since those other people did not sign the 1973 CC&R's, 
they are unenforceable in the areas covered by those plats, rendering them non-
uniform. The trial court denied this motion and entered judgment for Defendant, 
R0479-481, and this appeal timely followed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff/Appellant's arguments are based on statutes and judicial doctrines 
— chiefly the Utah Statute of Frauds and the judicial doctrine of descriptio 
personae - but, behind these arguments is a deeper policy argument- that the 
underlying purpose of these statutes and judicial doctrines is to let the real estate 
market rely on the records kept by the County Recorders. 
For example, Plaintiffs first argument is that the 1973 CC&R's are invalid 
because they were not signed by the owner of the property - "Security Title 
Company, Trustee," but by a stranger to the title, PMRI. This argument is framed 
in terms of the doctrine of descriptio personae - that the word "trustee" after the 
name of a grantee, standing alone will be disregarded in the absence of extrinsic 
evidence proving a trust existed, with the grantee taking the land in its own right. 
"Descriptio personae" is Latin, and this makes the doctrine seem abstract 
and stilted, but the doctrine deals with a practical problem: "if the extrinsic 
evidence does not show a trust existed, how can people be confident they can get 
good title from the owner of record?" 
The trial court held as a matter of law that the extrinsic evidence of the 1976 
plat proves as a matter of law that a trust existed and that PMRI was its 
beneficiary. Plaintiff argues that this was error. The 1965 Bates Deed was given 
19 
in 1965. Defendant must show by extrinsic evidence that a trust existed in 1965. 
PMRI did not even exist until it was incorporated on August 22, 1973, eight years 
later. PMRI does not describe itself as a trust beneficiary in the 1973CC&R's. 
The 1973 CC&R's only cover a fraction of the land covered by the4965 Bates 
Deed. The plat, recorded in 1976, does not describe PMRI as a trust beneficiary or 
mention a trust. There is no record of anyone conveying any interest in the 
property or in any trust to PMRI. PMRI was dissolved on December 31, 1979, 
with no record of its conveying its supposed beneficial interest in the trust to 
anyone. Plaintiff makes more factual points, but behind these is the deeper 
question: "would a reasonable person - looking at the recorded documents and 
seeing that PMRI had no interest of record - actually believe on the basis of the 
"owner's dedication" and the "subdivider's note" on the plat, that PMRI was a 
trust beneficiary of a trust holding title to the land covered by the plat?" 
Plaintiffs second argument assumes that this Court rejects his first 
argument and agrees with the trial court that PMRI was the beneficiary of a trust 
of which Security Title was the trustee whose res was the land shown on plat D. 
Plaintiff argues that PMRI as a trust beneficiary did not have the "estate" 
necessary for it to have "privity of estate" in any of the forms necessary to bind the 
land with covenants running with the land. "Privity of estate" is technical 
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language. Ordinary people do not use the word "privity of estate" in their 
everyday conversation. But, beneath this technical language is the deeper question 
of whether the law should permit land to be bound by permanent covenants 
running with the land by anyone other than the owner of the fee simple estate. 
Plaintiffs third argument assumes that the Court has decided that people 
with less than a fee simple estate can impose permanent covenants running with 
the land on land. Plaintiff then argues that under the Utah general law of trusts 
(as it was in 1973), the beneficiary of a trust had no power of disposition over the 
assets held in trust, but only a power of disposition over his beneficial interest in 
the trust. Plaintiff argues that only the trustee, Security Title, had the power to 
impose the CC&R's and it did not sign them. Again, behind this technical 
argument is a deeper argument. If the beneficiary of a trust has a power of 
disposition over the assets held in trust (as opposed to a power of disposition over 
his beneficial interest in the trust), the trustee will not be able to control the assets. 
The beneficiary's power of control will lead to traditional spendthrift trusts failing, 
the assets in traditional spendthrift trusts becoming vulnerable in bankruptcy, and 
to trusts becoming subject to the "grantor trust" provisions of the Federal income 
tax law. 
Plaintiffs fourth argument, assuming the Court rejects the first three, is that 
21 
the lack of uniformity produced by the 1973 CC&R's applying only to Pine 
Meadows Plats "A," B," "C," and "D," and not to Plats "E," "F," "G," "I", and the 
unplatted land covered by the 1973 CC&R's, renders them unenforceable even as 
to Plat "D." 
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in holding that enforceable 
CC&R's can be imposed on land under contract law without the formalities of 
written instruments, signatures, notarial acknowledgments and recordation. 
ARGUMENTS 
1. Descriptio personae applies because (1) there is no evidence 
contemporaneous with the 1965 Bates Deed that a trust actually existed, (2) 
PMRI could not have been the beneficiary of the trust in 1965 because it did 
not exist until 1973, and (3) the extrinsic evidence of the plat does not prove 
that a trust actually existed. 
Plaintiffs first argument is that Security Title Company owned the 
property covered by the 1965 Bates Deed (approximately 4,264.68 acres) outright 
under the common law doctrine of description personae. 
The common law doctrine of descriptio personae treats words that describe 
the grantor or grantee in a deed as irrelevant. The doctrine was expressly applied 
by this Court in TWN, Inc. v. Michel, 2003 UT App 70, 66 P.3d 1031. In that 
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case, a grantor executed a deed using the word "trustee" after his name. But, he 
had taken title in his own name without the word trustee. The grantor then 
executed a second deed to a second grantee without using the word "trustee" after 
his name. The second grantee argued that the first deed conveyed-nothing to the 
first grantee because the grantor held the land in his own right and not as trustee. 
In response, the first grantee invoked the doctrine of descriptio personae, arguing 
that the word "trustee" in the first deed should be disregarded. This Court agreed 
with the first grantee: 
"The unexplained use of the word 'trustee' on a real property deed does not, 
absent other circumstances suggesting the creation or existence of a trust, 
create a trust or implicate a trust interest. . . . [T]he deed should be 
read and interpreted as if the word 'trustee' were not there." 2003 UT App 
at para. 12, 66P.3dat 1034. 
This Court said in dicta in TWN that extrinsic evidence may be introduced 
to prove a trust actually existed. That is the law.2 The issue, then, is whether the 
extrinsic evidence in this case proves, first, that a trust actually existed and, next, 
that PMRI was its beneficiary. 
Turning to the extrinsic evidence available in this case, the most important 
evidence is the undisputed facts that (1) the Bates Deed was recorded in 1965, and 
(2) PMRI was not incorporated until 1973. If there actually were a trust, PMRI 
2
 Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood Dev. Corp., 655 P.2d 669, 669 (1982). 
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could not have been the beneficiary because it did not exist in 1965. The 1965 
Bates Deed must be construed based on 1965 evidence, not evidence of what 
happened eight or nine years later. 
If a trust existed in 1965, then must have had a beneficiary ("Beneficiary 
X") and the trust res must have been the 4,264.68 acres covered by the Bates 
Deed.3 There is no evidence whatsoever of any conveyance by Beneficiary X to 
PMRI of its beneficial interest in the trust. 
The trial court concluded that as a matter of law the extrinsic evidence of 
the plat established that a trust existed and that PMRI was the beneficiary, but 
neither the Owner's Dedication nor the Subdivider's Note describe PMRI as a 
"beneficiary" or mention a trust. The Subdivider's Note only speaks of PMRI as 
owning the streets, saying nothing about what interest, if any, it has in the rest of 
3
 In the companion case, Forest Meadows Property Owners Ass'n, 
Appellate No. 200430397 - CA, the trial court held that in 1971 the beneficiary of 
the trust evidenced by the word "trustee" in the 1965 Bates Deed was another 
corporation, Deseret Diversified Development. In this case, Peters, it held that 
the beneficiary was PMRI. The only way to solve this inconsistency is to posit 
that Beneficiary X convey its beneficial interest with respect to particular portions 
of the trust res first to Deseret Diversified (with respect to the south half of Section 
22) and then to PMRI (with respect to the 1,200 acres covered by the property 
description in the 1973 CC&R's). Assuming a trust beneficiary has the power to 
convey the trust's rights with respect to particular tracts of real property, those 
conveyances are subject to the Utah Statute of Frauds and must be by written deed 
subscribed by the grantor. And, at this point, those conveyances would be void for 
non-recordation. 
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the land covered by plat D, or the 1,200 acres covered by the 1973 CC&R's, or the 
4,264.68 acres covered by the 1965 Bates Deed. If PMRI owned the streets and 
nothing more, that would be a sufficient interest for it to sign the owner's 
dedication. The people who sign the owner's dedication on a plat-are not 
representing that they own the whole property covered by the plat, but only that 
they have some interest in some part of that property. This is illustrated by the 
plats for Plats "E," "F,"and "G" where other people sign with Security Title. 
If PMRI was the beneficiary of a trust with Security Title as trustee holding 
the land covered by the 1973 CC&R's, why was it allowed to be dissolved? It 
was dissolved on December 31, 1979, and its beneficial interest would have gone 
to someone. Why didn't that someone sign the subsequent Plats "E," "F," "G" and 
"I"? In particular, why is Plat "I" signed by Security Title alone? 
What would a reasonable person conclude from the evidence of plat D? 
The only evidence is that PMRI signed the "owner's dedication" as an owner and 
either it or Mr. W. Brent Jensen, dba Pine Meadows Ranch, is described in the 
"Subdivider's Note" as owning and being responsible for maintaining the streets. 
The first point is that an "owner's dedication" on a plat is like a quitclaim deed. In 
effect, the signors "quitclaim" to the public the dedicated property interests. As in 
the case of a quitclaim deed, the fact that people sign the owner's dedication does 
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not necessarily mean that they actually own anything. People can sign the 
dedication even if they own nothing. PMRFs signing is not evidence that it was 
an actual owner of any part of the property, much less the beneficiary of a trust. 
The "Subdivided s Note" says nothing about the existence of^a4rust. Nor 
does it say anything about the ownership of the land other than the streets. 
Moreover, the active role of PMRI (assuming PMRI and not W. Brent Jensen dba 
Pine Meadows Ranch was intended), to maintain the streets, is inconsistent with 
its being a trust beneficiary. It is the trustee who takes the active role in 
maintaining the trust res. The beneficiary's role is essentially passive. 
The active role taken by PMRI in maintaining the streets may be a clue to 
what was actually going on. The most likely explanation for the "Subdivider's 
Note" is that Summit County refused to be responsible for maintaining the streets, 
so Security Title got PMRI (or Mr. W. Brent Jensen, dba Pine Meadow Ranch) to 
agree to maintain the streets in order to get Summit County to approve the plat. 
Their agreement was that the streets (most likely not in fee simple, but in the sense 
of an easement)4 would belong to PMRI or Mr. W. Brent Jensen. But, the 
4
 In Utah, roads are often "owned" by owning an easement of right-of-way 
and not the fee; e.g., Utah Code Ann. see's 72 - 5 - 103 ("Acquisition of rights-of-
way and other real property - Title to property acquired) and 7 2 - 5 - 1 0 4 ("Public 
use constituting dedication - Scope) (2000). 
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arrangement did not work out and Security Title never actually conveyed the 
easement. 
This explanation is consistent with the Owner's Dedication. If Security 
Title owned the land (whether in its own right or as trustee for Beneficiary X) and 
expected PMRI to own an easement covering the streets, the County would want 
them both to sign the Owner's Dedication. 
But, does PMRI own the streets in plat D? 5 There is no deed, recorded or 
not, from Security Title to PMRI conveying the streets any other interest in (1) the 
4,264. 68 acres covered by the 1965 Bates Deed, (2) the 1,200 acres covered by 
the property description in the 1973 CC&R's, or (3) the portion of the 1,200 acres 
covered by Plat "D." Therefore, although the Subdivider's Note put Petitioner on 
inquiry notice to look for a deed, since no deed has been found, under the Utah 
Recording Act whatever deed PMRI may have been given is now void for non-
recordation.6 
From the perspective of the law, the important point is that for extrinsic 
evidence to trump the doctrine of descriptio personae, it must prove that a trust 
5
 Actually, since PMRI was dissolved on December 31, 1979, whatever 
property it owned has devolved to its shareholders, whoever they may be. 
6
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 57 - 3 - 103 (2000)("Effect of failure to record"). 
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actually existed. Evidence that is merely consistent with a trust's existence is not 
enough. A plausible explanation is no substitute for proof. 
An example of a case where the extrinsic evidence proved a trust actually 
existed is a 1981 Texas case, Neeley v. Intercity Management Corp^ ^ 23 S.W.2d 
946 (Texas App. 1981). 
In Neeley, Driscoll Production Corporation ("DPC") was in the business of 
developing oil properties for investors. The investors paid in money and received 
assignments of specific oil properties. But, some of the assignments were not 
recorded. To correct this situation, DPC as grantor deeded to DPC "as trustee" 
those oil properties that it was holding in trust for the investors. This deed was 
duly recorded. Subsequently, DNC's creditors disputed the investors' rights in 
these properties, arguing that the assignment from DPC to DPC as trustee was 
ineffective under the doctrine of descriptio personam The extrinsic evidence of 
the business dealings established - independently of the deed - that (1) DNC was 
the trustee, (2) the investors were the beneficiaries and (3) the oil properties paid 
for by the investors were the trust res. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that 
the extrinsic evidence proved that a valid trust had been created independently of 
the deed. The deed from "DPC" to "DPC Trustee" reflected the existence of this 
trust. It did not create the trust. 
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In our case there is no extrinsic evidence analogous to the evidence in 
Neeley to show that a trust actually existed in 1965 and that PMRI was assigned a 
beneficial interest in such a trust in 1973 after it was incorporated. In our case, the 
extrinsic evidence only shows that when Plat "D" was recorded in-4976, PMRI 
may have had some ownership interest in the streets in Pine Meadow Ranch Plat 
D. In our case, the only evidence there was a trust is the word "trustee" in the 
1965 Bates Deed, and under the doctrine of descriptio personae that is not 
enough. 
2. Assuming it was a trust beneficiary, PMRI was not in "privity of 
estate" for purposes of covenants running with the land because Security 
Title owned the land in fee simple estate. 
If the Court decides that as a matter of law a trust existed with Security Title 
as trustee, PMRI as beneficiary, and the land covered by plat D as trust res,7 it 
should go on to Plaintiffs second argument. Plaintiff argues that in order for 
PMRI to impose covenants running with the land, under Utah law it had to own 
7
 Limiting the trust res to the property covered by Plat D would be 
necessary to counter the embarrassing inconsistency between the rulings and 
orders of the trial court in the two cases. In the companion case, the trial court 
ruled that the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's cover Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D. But, 
the western portion of Forest Meadow Plat D extends into Section 21, and the 
1973 CC&R's by their terms cover all of Section 21. 
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an "estate" on August 22, 1973, when the 1973 CC&R's were recorded in order to 
be in mutual or horizontal "privity of estate" with the person who originally 
promised to be bound by the covenants; Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton 
Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989). Plaintiff argues that PMRI4*ad no estate 
because Security Title Company owned the land in fee simple. 
American real property law is based on a system of "estates."8 In essence, 
an "estate" is a present possessory interest in real property.9 American real 
property law recognizes only four basic estates - the fee simple, the fee tail, the 
life estate, and the estate for a term of years.10 Utah does not recognize the fee tail, 
so in Utah there are only three basic estates. 
The historic reason for this limitation in the number of estates is the 
medieval statute Quia Emptores enacted in England in 1290.11 This statute barred 
8
 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY, sec. 14 - 22 (1936). 
9
 Id. sec. 9. The restatement definition also includes certain future interests 
that will or may become possessory in the future. These future interests are not 
relevant in this case. 
10
 There are variations on these basic four which can be called distinct 
estates. A fee simple can be absolute, determinable, on condition subsequent, or 
subject to an executory limitation. A variation of a life estate is the estate pur 
autre vie where the measuring life is not the tenant's life. The term of years can 
be periodic, at will, or at sufferance. Still there are only four basic estates. 
11
 Act of 18Edw. I,c. 1(1290). 
30 
subinfeudation (in effect, the creation of new estates) but made the fee simple 
estate alienable. At first blush it seems ridiculous for modern courts to hold to 
such an ancient rule of law, but holding to the ancient rule means that people 
today know what their rights are. Today the fee simple estate, the life estate, and 
the estate for a term of years are standard packages of rights that people have come 
to understand. 
An analogy is sometimes drawn between an estate and a bundle of sticks, 
with each right of the estate's owner being one of the sticks in the bundle. 
Applying the analogy to this case, the issue is who owned the stick entitled "right 
to impose permanent covenants running with the land" when the 1973 CC&R's 
were recorded? The answer depends on who owned the estate (present possessory 
interest) in the land at that time because only the owner of the estate could be in 
"privity of estate" with anyone. 
The person who owned the estate in fee simple at that time was "Security 
Title Company, Trustee" because by statute, the effect of the 1965 Bates Deed (as 
a warranty deed) was to convey the whole 4,264.68 acres to it "in fee simple." 
"A warranty deed . . . shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple 
to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises therein named, together 
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with all appurtenances, rights, and privileges thereunto belonging . . . ,"12 
Therefore, even on the assumption that PMRI had an equitable interest in the land 
as the beneficiary of a trust, it had no "estate" and, therefore, could not be in 
"privity of estate" with anyone and, therefore, could not bind the land with 
covenants running with the land. 
The consequence of this Court following this ancient rule of law in our case 
will be that only the owner of the fee simple estate will be able to impose 
permanent covenants running with the land.13 The stick entitled "right to impose 
permanent covenants running with the land" will be part of the bundle of rights 
called "the fee simple estate." This stick will not be part of the bundle of rights of 
the beneficiary of a trust whose trustee owns land in trust in fee simple. 
A strong policy reason for the requiring that the owner in fee simple estate 
impose any permanent covenants is that it assures that the owner in fee simple 
actually wants to impose the covenants. Allowing people with other ownership 
interests to impose permanent covenants without obtaining the signature of the 
owner in fee simple estate will inevitably raise the question of whether the 
12
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 5 7 - 1 - 1 2 (2000)("Form of warranty deed -
Effect"). 
13
 The owners of a life estate or an estate for term of years will be able to 
impose covenants for the duration of their estates, but not permanent covenants. 
32 
covenants are binding - as illustrated by this case. 
3. PMRI was (1) not in "mutual privity" because the covenants did not 
arise from a transaction between it and a mutual owner of the same parcel of 
land, (2) not in "horizontal privity" because it did not convey 4he land to a 
person who agreed to be bound by the covenants, and (3) not in "vertical 
privity" because it did not convey land to Plaintiff/Appellant's predecessor in 
interest. 
In Flying Diamond Oil, the Utah Supreme Court identified three types of 
"privity of estate" in the sense of three relationships between the covenantor and 
the covenantee that would meet the requirement of "privity of estate" - (1) mutual 
privity (a covenant arising from simultaneous interests in the same piece of land), 
(2) horizontal privity (a covenant created in connection with a conveyance of an 
estate from one party to another), and (3) vertical privity (the devolution of an 
estate burdened or benefitted by a covenant from an original covenanting party to 
a successor).14 The Utah Supreme Court held that "mutual" privity and "vertical 
privity" existed in Flying Diamond Oil where it held that a covenant to pay an oil 
royalty ran with the land. 
The Restatement position is that there must be either mutual or horizontal 
14
 Flying Diamond Oil, 776 P.2d at 628. 
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privity and vertical privity. This position is consistent with the holding in Flying 
Diamond Oil, but not necessarily compelled by it. 
In the case of a declaration of CC&R's, "horizontal privity" typically arises 
when the declarant deeds the lot to a grantee after the CC&R's are-recorded. This 
sale is the "real estate transaction" between the declarant and the first grantee that 
creates horizontal privity. "Vertical privity" then arises later, when the first 
grantee sells to a successor in interest. 
In this case, PMRI did not sell Lot 6 to Plaintiffs predecessor in interest. 
Security Title sold the lot to Mountainland Properties. So PMRI was not in 
"horizontal privity" with anyone. 
There is no "mutual privity" in this case because PMRI did not enter into a 
transaction with a person who had rights in the same piece of real property.16 
"Mutual privity" is illustrated by the facts of Flying Diamond Oil where the owner 
of the surface rights and the owner of the subsurface rights entered into an 
agreement with respect to the shared parcel of land. "Mutual privity" never exists 
with respect to a declaration of CC&R's because a declaration is a unilateral act. 
15
 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY sec. 534 - 35 (1944). 
16
 "There is mutual privity if the parties have common rights in property." 
Note, Covenants Running with the Land: Viable Doctrine or Common-law Relic, 7 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 139, 145 (1978), cited in Flying Diamond Oil, 776 P.2d at 623. 
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The trial court found there was "mutual privity" in this case because it held 
that Security Title was the trustee and PMRI was the beneficiary of the trust with 
respect to Plat D. Even assuming the trial court was right about PMRI being a 
trust beneficiary, there still would not be "mutual privity" because4he 1973 
CC&R's were imposed unilaterally by PMRI and not by a recorded agreement 
between it as beneficiary and Security Title as trustee. 
There is no "vertical privity" in this case because PMRI is not Plaintiffs 
predecessor in interest. Vertical privity arises after the original parties make their 
agreement creating either mutual or horizontal privity. It arises only if the person 
against whom the covenant is to be enforced is a successor in interest to the 
original promisor. In this case, where the recording of the 1973 CC&R's was a 
unilateral act, vertical privity would only exist if Plaintiff/Appellant were a 
successor in interest to PMRI.17 But, Plaintiff is a successor in interest to Security 
Title, not to PMRI. PMRI is a "stranger" to Plaintiffs chain of title. 
17
 In Flying Diamond Oil, vertical privity existed because Flying Diamond 
(who sought to enforce the covenant) had purchased the surface rights from 
Newton, the original promisee. 776 P.2d at 628. 
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4. The holding of this Court in Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain 
Fonds (that inferences drawn from recorded documents are no substitute for 
a recorded deed), applies in this case because the Utah Statute of Frauds and 
the Utah Recording Act make no distinction between title and trther interests 
in real property. 
In his first motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff relied on the decision 
of this Court in Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds,1* for the rule that 
the trial court could not create ownership in PMRI in 1973 from inferences drawn 
from the recorded documents in the face of Security Title's record title. But, the 
trial court held that Dunlap did not apply because Dunlap involved competing 
claims of title, and this case does not. Plaintiff argues that this is not a valid 
distinction because the difference in the facts is not legally relevant. 
Whenever cases are distinguished "on their facts" the factual difference 
must be legally relevant. Cases cannot be distinguished simply because the facts 
are different. The facts are always different. For example, the parties, the 
property, and the dates are always different. But these differences are not legally 
relevant. Cases can only be distinguished if the difference in the facts is legally 
relevant. 
18
 2003 UT App. 238, 76 P.3d 711. 
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In Dunlap, the parties made competing claims to a mining claim -
competing claims of "title." In this case, the parties make competing claims as to 
who owned property in 1973. Is the distinction between present ownership in 
Dunlap and past ownership in this case relevant to the law? 
It is not relevant. In Dunlap the Dunlaps claimed ownership based on 
inferences drawn from recorded documents, chiefly a recorded mortgage deed that 
recited that the purpose of the loan it secured was for the mortgagor, Park City 
Development, to purchase the mining claim from its "then owner." But, there was 
no recorded deed from the "then owner" of record, New Park - Nevada, to Park 
City Development. Stichtings Mayflower traced its ownership back to New Park -
Nevada. In Dunlap the trial court drew the inference from language in the 
mortgage deed (that the purpose of the loan was for the mortgagor to buy the 
mining claim from its "then owner") that New Park - Nevada had previously 
deeded the property to Park City Development, validating the Dunlaps' claim 
which they traced back to the Park City Development. This Court reversed the 
trial court, holding that a valid conveyance cannot be created by inferences of an 
unrecorded deed (i.e., from New Park Nevada to Park City Development). Under 
the Utah Recording Act, such an unrecorded deed is void. For the trial court to 
create a deed out of inferences in the face of the statute was error. 
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In our case, the trial court drew the inference from the ambiguous 
statements on Plat D that Beneficiary X had deeded its beneficial interest in a 
specific trust asset (the acres in the plat or, perhaps, the 1,200 acres purportedly 
covered by the 1973 CC&R's) to PMRI after PMRI was incorporated and before 
the 1973 CC&R's were recorded.19 But, if there was such a deed, it was an 
unrecorded deed and is void as to Plaintiff. Neither the Utah Statute of Frauds nor 
the Utah Recording Act make any distinction between real property held in trust 
and real property not held in trust. The only distinction made by the statute is for 
"leases for a term not exceeding one year." The Utah Statute of Frauds expressly 
includes "any trust or power over or concerning real property." So, the factual 
distinction between the facts of Dunlap and the facts of this case is not legally 
relevant for purposes of the Utah Statute of Frauds and the Utah Recording Act. 
So, the question that Defendant needs to answer in its brief is "why is it 
legally relevant that Dunlap involved present title and this case involves past 
ownership?" 
The five week period from August 22 to September 28, 1973. 
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5. Under the Utah general law of trusts, the beneficiary does not have 
the power to encumber or otherwise dispose of the assets held by the trustee. 
If this Court decides that the beneficiary does stand in privity of estate with 
the transferees of the trustee, and that interests in real property can%e based on 
inferences of an unrecorded deed, it should go on to Petitioner's fifth argument -
that under the Utah general law of trusts the trust beneficiary does not have the 
power to encumber or otherwise dispose of property held by the trustee in trust, 
and, therefore, the 1973 CC&R's are ineffective. 
This is a question of the Utah general law of trusts because, assuming there 
was a trust, the express terms of trust are not known.20 So, this Court should apply 
Utah's default rules for the trust relationship, the rules that apply in the absence of 
express provisions.21 
It is true that in the language of trusts, the beneficiary is said to have 
20
 No trust document has been produced in this case. 
21
 Today in 2004, the relevant Utah law is the Utah Uniform Probate Code, 
Utah Code Ann. see's. 7 5 - 7 - 4 0 1 et seq. ("Uniform Trustee's Powers 
Provisions"). It provides that the trustee has the power to subdivide and develop 
real property, Utah Code Ann. 75 - 7 - 402 (3) (j). This provision would, today, 
give a trustee the power to impose CC&R's. The Uniform Probate Code gives no 
such power, or any other power of disposition over the trust res, to the beneficiary. 
This is consistent with the common law of trusts. But, the Uniform Probate Code 
was enacted in 1975, well after the 1965 Bates Deed and the 1973 CC&R's. 
Therefore, Plaintiff deals with this point as one of common law. 
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"equitable title" to the property held by the trustee in trust while the trustee is said 
to have "legal title." The phrase "equitable title" means that the beneficiary bears 
the risk of loss if the property declines in value and chance of gain if the property 
increases in value. It does not mean that the beneficiary has a powerto dispose of 
the specific items of property held by the trustee. For example, suppose T holds 
Blackacre in trust for the benefit of B. B has "equitable title" in the sense that B 
has the risk of loss and chance of gain with respect to Blackacre. Under the 
general law of trusts, B can sell his beneficial interest in the trust (in effect, 
substituting the purchaser as a new beneficiary in his place), but B cannot sell 
Blackacre itself. 
If this Court reverses this ancient rule of law and holds that a beneficiary 
has a power of disposition over the assets held in trust, it will have radical 
consequences. 
(1) The trustee will no longer be able to control the trust assets because 
there will always be a risk that the beneficiary will exercise the power. What 
happens if the beneficiary exercises the power without notice to the trustee and the 
trustee then attempts to exercise the same power? Traditional spendthrift trust 
provisions (which bar the beneficiary from disposing of his or her beneficial 
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interest in the trust)22 will not prohibit the exercise of this new power because they 
do not speak to power over the assets in the trust but only bar the beneficiary from 
disposing of his beneficial interest in the trust. The new power of disposition will 
cause these spendthrift trusts to fail.23 
(2) Many trusts involve multiple beneficial interests, some simultaneous and 
others in sequence of time. If A and B are simultaneous co-beneficiaries, does A 
alone have any power over specific trust assets? If A is the income beneficiary for 
life followed by B for life, followed by C for life, etc., does A have any power 
over specific trust assets? If the trust provides for income to be accumulated by 
the trustee, does the beneficiary have a power of disposition over the assets that 
produces the income? These questions never had to be answered under the 
22
 76 A M J U R . 2 D Trusts sec. 121 ("General nature and purposes of 
protective trusts; spendthrift trusts generally"). 
23
 76 AM.JUR.2D Trusts sec. 130 ("Dominion and control of beneficiary"): 
"The very basis of a spendthrift trust - the provision of maintenance and 
support so someone in a way that protects the assets from the beneficiary's 
improvidence - fails when the settlor has given the beneficiary the ability to 
exercise dominion and control over the corpus form. Hence it is apparent that the 
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust cannot be endowed with the entire dominion and 
control of the trust property. Rather, the trust must be an active one in order not to 
be executed into a legal estate or interest. Otherwise, where the beneficiary 
exercises absolute dominion over the property of a spendthrift trust, such trust 
fails." [citations omitted]." 
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traditional general law of trusts because the beneficiary had no such power. If 
this Court changes the rule, these and other questions will have to be answered. 
(3) The effect of the bankruptcy of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust will 
change. A spendthrift trust normally survives the bankruptcy of the^beneficiary 
intact because the federal bankruptcy statute expressly gives effect to traditional 
spendthrift provisions that bar the beneficiary from disposing of his beneficial 
interest in the trust.24 But, if the beneficiary has a power of disposition over the 
individual assets, the assets will go to the bankrupt beneficiary's estate under other 
provisions of the federal bankruptcy law.25 The spendthrift trust will survive as a 
hollow shell since all the assets will be sucked out thanks to the beneficiary's 
power of disposition. 
24
 Section 541 (c) (2) of the Federal bankruptcy code excludes from the 
debtor's estate the debtor's beneficial interest in a spendthrift trust by means of the 
following language: 
"A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust 
that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case 
under this title." 11 U.S.C. sec. 541 (c) (2). 
25
 Under Section 541 (a) (1), all interests whatsoever of the debtor are 
included in the bankrupt estate unless expressly excepted. 
"Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case 
[go into the debtor's estate]." 11 U.S.C. sec. 541 (a) (1). 
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(4) Another consequence of the beneficiary having a power of disposition 
over the assets within the trust is that the trust will cease to exist for federal 
income tax purposes. The beneficiary's power of disposition will trigger the 
"grantor trust" provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which provide that when a 
trust beneficiary has dominion and control over the trust assets, all items of 
income and deduction must be reported by the beneficiary rather than the trustee.26 
6. The 1973 CC&R's are unenforceable under the doctrine of 
uniformity because they only cover Pine Meadow Ranch Plat D, and not the 
rest of the 1,200 acres that they purport to cover. 
Pine Meadow Ranch currently consists of eight plats - A (104 lots), B (81 
lots), C (49 lots), D (85 lots), E (100 lots), F (83 lots), G (101 lots) and I (43 lots). 
The plats for A, B, and C are similar to the plat for D - PMRI signed the owner's 
dedication and PMRI or Mr. W. Brent Jensen signed a similar "Subdivider's 
Note." But, the plats for E, F, G, and I (a majority of the lots) were recorded in 
26
 Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Sections 671 - 679 (as amended). If the 
grantor is the beneficiary and as such has a general power of disposition over the 
trust assets, the applicable sections are 673 (reversionary interests), 674 (power to 
control beneficial enjoyment), 675 (administrative powers), 676 (power to 
revoke), and 677 (income for the benefit of the grantor). If the beneficiary is not 
the grantor, the applicable section is 678 (person other than grantor treated as 
substantial owner) which is triggered when a person "has a power exercisable 
solely by himself to vest the corpus or the income therefrom in himself." 
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1987 long after PMRI was dissolved at the end of 1979. On plats E, F, G, and I, 
other people signed the owner's dedications with Security Title. Security Title 
alone signed the owner's dedication on Plat I. If this Court agrees with the trial 
court that an inference can be drawn from the signing of an owner-dedication as to 
who is the beneficiary of a trust, and that a beneficiary has the power to bind real 
property held in trust with permanent CC&R's, then the 1973 CC&R's are not 
binding on Plats E, F, G and I because they were not signed by Security Title or by 
those trust beneficaries. In any event, the 1973 CC&R's only bind 219 of 444 lots 
- they do not bind most of the lots and the portion of the 1,200 acres they purport 
to cover that is still unplatted. 
Under the doctrine of uniformity, CC&R's that are irrationally and unfairly 
non-uniform are not enforceable.27 So, if the Court rejects every other argument 
Plaintiff has made, it should address this last argument - which Petitioner will 
make in the form of a question: "how can the 1973 CC&R's be enforced fairly 
when they only apply to a minority of the lots? 
27
 20 AM.JUR.2D Covenants, sec. 160 (1995) ("Requisites as to uniformity 
of restrictions"): 
"Restrictive covenants in deeds will not be enforced at the instance of other 
property owners unless there is reasonable uniformity in the restrictions imposed, 
so that each lot owner is afforded protection against acts of others equal to the 
restriction on his or her own acts." 
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7. The trial court was mistaken in concluding that "Plaintiff's 
predecessors in interest" had agreed to the 1973 CC&R's, andheven if one of 
them had so agreed, that agreement would be unenforceable under the Utah 
Statute of Frauds and void under the Utah Recording Act. 
In its Ruling and Order, the trial court makes the following statement: 
""[E]ven if they [the 1973 CC&R's] are not restrictive covenants that run with the 
land, they are restrictions that were contractually agreed upon [by] the Plaintiffs 
predecessors in interest and the developer of the subdivision. Plaintiff had notice 
of such contractually agreed upon restrictions and therefore, Plaintiff is bound by 
that contract and the restrictions contained therein." R0419, "Ruling and Order" 
at p. 4. 
Plaintiff respectfully points out that CC&R's constitute interests in real 
property subject to the Utah Statute of Frauds and the Utah Recording Act. Even 
if there were parole evidence in the record that one or more of Plaintiffs 
predecessors in interest had agreed to impose the 1973 CC&R's on lot 6 (and there 
is not), the agreement would not be enforceable under the Utah Statute of Frauds 
without a written document subscribed by the then owner. There is no such 
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document in this case. Further, that document must be recorded or it is void 
against Plaintiff under the Utah Recording Act. 
The trial court appears to have believed that compliance with the Utah 
Statute of Frauds and the Utah Recording Act is only one way to create binding 
CC&R's, that contract law provides an alternative route without the hassle of 
written documents, signatures, notarial seals, and recordation. With all due 
respect, the trial court is wrong on this point. The market for real estate cannot 
function if there is an alternative way to create valid interests in real property that 
leaves no record at the offices of Utah's County Recorders. 
The statement by the trial court that the "developer of the subdivision" 
agreed to the 1973 CC&R's appears to refer to PMRI. Even if PMRI were shown 
to be the "developer of the subdivision" in the record ( and it has not been so 
shown) status as "developer" would not permit PMRI to impose CC&R's on land 
without compliance with the established rules of law. There is no alternative route 
to impose CC&R's based merely on personal status. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully asks the Court to 
remand this case to the District Court with instructions to enter summary judgment 
for Plaintiff clearing his title to Lot 6 of the encumbrances of the 1973 CC&R's 
46 
and the 1980 Notice of Lien because the 1973 CC&R's are invalid because they 
were not signed by the owner of record of the property, Security Title Company. 
If the Court rejects Plaintiffs first argument, Petitioner respectfully asks that the 
Court remand the case with the same instructions based on one or more of 
Plaintiffs other arguments - and for such other and further relief as is in 
accordance with the law. 
Dated: August D , 2004 
Respectfully submitted: 
[/^ L i / 
/s/ Boyd Kimball Dyer 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPEfcLANT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the following date I served two copies of the forgoing 
Opening Brief by depositing the same in the U.S. Postal Service, first class 
postage prepaid, addressed to the following person: 
Mr. Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 - 2216 
Dated: August. 
/s/ Bc^d)ECimball Dyer 
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ADDENDUM 
Addendum Document "1" - 1965 Bates Deed, 
ae M. Fee Paid $ 
Dep. Book- . P I M . 
Mifl tax oorice tou. Addrea_ 
"aGfvxa-
In Oasi 1...H3...
 c f f lcrof P<t.^ 188 
WARRANTY DEED 
?. I . SATES, also knovn as 7. Ephraita Bates, and 
.MAE ?. BATES, also known as Mae Pritchett Bates, h i s wife 
of Coalville County of Sumait 
CONVEY md WARRANT to 
• Reccrcicf. Simralr CounW, UiaH untv, 
grantor s 
State of Utah, hereby 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, TRUSTEE, 
a Corporation of Utah 
of S a l t Lake C i ty Covrsty S a l t Lake 
for the sura of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION 
grantee 
, State of Utah 
- -DOi&xm 
the following described tract of land .In 
Sate of Utah, to-vin 
Sums It and Hon an County, 
The South half of Section 16; the East half of the Southeast 
quarter of Section 17; the E.tst half of the East half of 
Section 20; a l l of Sections 21, 22, 27 and 28; the East half 
of the East half of Section 29; the North half and the North 
half of the South half of Section 33; the North half and the 
North half of the South half of Section 34; a l l In Tovnship 
1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(Containing ^proximately 4264.63 acres.) 
TOCETEER WITS a l l vater and vater r ights however evidenced 
appurtenant to or used upon or la connection with said property. 
SUBJECT TO easements, res tr ic t ions and rights of vay appearing 
of record or enforceable in lav and equity, and taxes for the 
year 1965 and thereafter. 
WTTNESS the hand sofnJd {rancors, this 14 th «^ T of 
Signed in the presence of 
October A.aW65. 
Z-^.Os^Z-
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT 1A10C 
\~ y • 
C^ptanuxjJoQ Expircst 
12/21/67 
SSL 
On the 14 th day of October. A. D. 13 65 perweafly 
tppesred before me 7 . Z. BATES, also knovn A* 7. Ephraba Bates, 
and MAS P. BATES, also knovn as Ka« Pritchett &ates, 
h i s vifa 
the rigncrsof »he within Imtrumcnr, who duly aefcoowtodgod 
to me that t he e^xecuted the stm«. ' 
...Notary P u U k . ^ ^ " , f ^ ^ > : v # ^ $ & J 
Addendum Document "2" - First Page of Articles of Incorporation of Pine 
Meadows Ranch, Inc. 
Exh ib i t H 
, _ CFPICE of 
- --T^fty OF STATE 
^r^rnG ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
 WT, fl .„ iifl . 
OF 
PINE MEADOW RANCH, INC. 
We, the undersigned natural persons of the age of twenty-
one (21) years or more acting as incorporators of a corporation 
under the Utah Business Corporation Act, adopt the following 
Articles of Incorporation for such corporation, 
ARTICLE I 
Name 
The name of the corporation is: 
PINE MEADOW RANCH, INC. 
ARTICLE II 
Duration 
The period of duration is perpetual, 
ARTICLE III 
Purpose 
The nature of the business, and the objects and purposes 
proposed to be transacted, promoted and carried on, are to 
do any or all of the things herein mentioned, as fully and 
to the same extent as natural persons might or could do, 
and in any part of the world, viz: Acquiring, developing, promoting 
and selling real property and to engage in any other lawful 
activity in which a corporation can be engaged in the State of 
Utah. 
The objects and purposes specified herein shall be regarded 
as independent objects and purposes and shall not be limited 
or restricted by reference to, or inference from, the terms 
of any other clause of these Articles of Incorporation. 
yCr — J3Q1S1 V K Q 3 Q <LL-22'%1 
Addendum Document "3" - The 1973 CC&R's. 
DECLARATION 
Entry No, . . 1 2 . 0 ^ 6 7 .>.': S-lSO 
RECORDnD..%1*?.*^?e ,ya:37>' "• ^ / . ^ 
REQUEST , ; ...^/- <?"•/?/ ^ * M > „ 
FEE w,j;z».\ ' t »• ,,. j*>*TM»f o.^..^eco/«)£ji 
INOEXED -5 in:ia,rr _ _ _ / . ' ' ^ 
OF' COVENANTS; CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS 
THIS DECLARATION, made on this 15 day of August, 1973, 
by'rttaE MEADOW RANCH, INC., hereinafter referred to as "Declarant." 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, Declarant i s the owner of or intends to acquire 
certain property in Summit County, State of Utah, which i s more 
particularly described as: 
The South one-half of section 16; the East half of the Southeast 
quarter of Section 17; the East half of the East half of Section 
20; All of Section 21; a l l in Township 1 North, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian (containing approximately 1,200 acres ) . 
NOW THEREFORE, Declarant hereby declares that a l l of the 
properties descrlDed above shall be held, sold and conveyed 
subject to the following easements, restr ic t ions , covenants, 
and conditions, which are for the purpose of protecting the 
value and des irabi l i ty of, and which shall run with', the real 
property and be binding on a l l parties having any right, t i t l e 
or Interest in the described properties or any part thereof, 
their he irs , successors and ass igns, and shal l inure '.o the 
benefit of each owner thereof. 
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ARTICLE I 
DEFINITIONS 
Section 1» "Association" shall mean and refer to Pine 
Meadow Ranch Home Owners' Association, its successors and assigns. 
Section 2. "Owner11 shall mean and refer to the recooi owner, 
whether one or more persons or entities, of a fee simple title to 
any Lot which is a part of the Properties, including contract 
sellers, but excluding those having such interest merely an 
security for the performance of an obligation. 
Section 3. "Properties" shall mean and refer to that certain 
real property hereinbefore described, and such additions thereto as 
may hereafter b e brought within the jurisdiction of the Association. 
Section 4. "Common Area" shall mean all real property owned by 
the Association for the common use and enjoyment of the owners. The 
Common Area to be owned by the Association at the time of the conveyance 
of the first lot is described as follows: 
Section 5. "Lot" shall mean and refer to any plot of land shown 
upon any recorded subdivision map of the Properties with the exception 
of the Common Area. 
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Section 6. "Declarant" aha 11 mean and refer to P^ .ne Meadow 
Ranch, Inc., its successor* and assigns If auch aucceasora or assigns 
should acquire more Chan one undeveloped Lot from the Declarant for 
the purpose of development. 
ARTICLE II 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Section 1, Owner.*.1 Easements of Enjoyment. Every owner shall 
have a right and easement of enjoyment In and to the Common Area 
which shall be appurtenant to and shall pass with the title to every 
Lot, subject to the following provisions: 
(a) The right of the Association to charge reasonable 
adraiaalon and other fees for the use of any recreational 
facility situated upon the Common Area; 
(b) The right of the Association to suspend the voting 
rights and right to use of the recreational facilities by 
an owner for cny period during which any assessment against 
his Lot remains unpaid; and for a period not to exceed 60 days 
for any infraction of its published rules and regulations; 
(c) The right of the Association to indicate or transfer 
all or any part of the Common Area to any public agency, 
authority, or utility for such purposes and 3ubject to such 
conditions as may be agreed to by the members. No auch 
dedication or transfer shall be effective unless an instrument 
signed by two-thirds C2/3) of each member agreeing to auch 
dedication or transfer has been recorded. 
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Section 2. Delegation of Uae. Any owner may delegate, in 
accordance with the By-Laws, his right of enjoyment to the Coxamon 
Area and facilities to .the members of his family, his tenants, or 
contract purchasers, 
ARTICLE III 
MEMBERSHIP AND VOTING RIGHTS 
Section 1. Every owner of a lot which is subject to assessment 
shall be a member of the Association. Membership shall be appurtenant 
to and may not be separated from ownership of any Lot which is subject 
to assessment. 
Section 2. The Association shall have only one class of voting 
membership: A member shall be all Owners and shall be entitled to 
on* vote for each Lot owned. When more than one person holds an 
interest in any Lot, all such persons shall be members. The vote 
for such Lot shall be exercised as they among themselves determine, 
but in no event shall more than one vofa be cast with respect to any Lot. 
ARTICLE IV 
COVENANTS FOR MAINTENANCE ASSESSMENTS 
Section 1, Creation of the Lien and Personal Obligation 
of Assessments. The Declarant, for each Lot owned within the 
Properties, hereby covenants, and each Ovn«r of any Lot by 
acceptance of a deed therefor, whether of not it shall be so 
expressed in such deed, is deemed to covenant-and agree to pay to 
the Association: (1) annual assessments or charges, and (2) 
special assessments for capital improvements, such assessments to 
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be esfcaolished'attd collected 4s hereinafter provided. The annual 
and special'assessments, together with Interest, costs, and 
reasonable attorney1s feen, shall be a charge on the land and 
shall be a continuing lion upon the property against which each 
iuch assessment is made. Each such assessment, together with 
interest, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees, shall also be 
the personal obligation of the person who was the Owner of such 
property at the time when the assessment fell due. The personal 
obligation for dellzjquent assessments shall not pass to his 
successors in title unless expressly assumed by them. 
Section 2. Purpose of Assessments. The assessments levied 
by the Association shall be used exclusively to promote the 
recreation, health, safety, and welfare of the residents in the 
Properties and for the improvement, and. maintenance of the recorded 
roads, Common Area, and of the homes situated upon the Properties, 
Section 3. It is agreed that the Association has the right, 
in the event any member allows his lot or lots to become an eye-so re, 
unattractive, or a nuisance by taeans of neglect or carelessness, to 
cause the lot to be corrected. The coat of such correction to be 
paid by the members and to become a li-m on the lot being so corrected. 
However, before the Asaociatlon can take such action the member must 
be given 30-days written notice by registered mail. 
Section 4. Special Assessments for Capital improvements. In 
addition to the annual assessments authorised above, the Association 
•5-
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may levyt- In any assessment y>aar, a special assessment applicable 
to that, year only for the purpose of defraying, in whole or in part, 
the Jcoat of any* construction, reconstruction, repair or replacement 
of a capital improvement upon the Common Area, including fixtures 
and personal property related thereto, provided that any such 
assessment iha l l have the assent of two-thirds (2/3) of the votes 
of each member whom are voting in person or by proxy at a meeting 
duly called for this purpose. 
Section 5. Notice and Quorum for Any Action Authorized Under 
Section 3. Written notice ot any meeting cal led for the purpose 
of talcing any action authorized under Section 3 shal l be 3ent to a l l 
members not less than 30 days nor more than 60 days in advance of the 
meeting. At the f i r s t such meeting ca l l ed , the presence of members 
or of proxies ent i t led to cast sixty percent (60Z) of a l l the votes 
of each class of membership shall const i tute a quorum. If the 
required quorum i s not present, another meeting may be called 
subject to the aame notice requirement, and the required quorum at 
the subsequent meeting shall b*» one-half C1/2) of the required 
quorum at the preceding meeting. No such subsequent meeting shall 
be held more than 60 days following the preceding meeting. 
Section 6, Uniform Rate of Assessment. Bouh annual and 
special assessments must be fixed at a uniform rate for services 
provided for a l l Lots, and may be col lected on a monthly, quarterly 
or annual basis« 
Section 7. Date of Commencement of Annual Assessments: Due Dates. 
The annual aaaeaamenta provided for herein shal l commence as to a l l 
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Lots on the first day of the month following the conveyance of the 
Common Area* The first annual assessment shall be adjusted according 
to the number of months remaining in «/ve calendar year. The Board 
of Directors stall fix the amount of the annual assessment against 
each Lot at least thirty (30) daya in advance of each annual 
assessment period. Written notice of the annual assessment shall 
be aent to evei/ Owner subject thereto. The due dates shall ^e 
established by the Board of Directors. The Association shaH, upon 
demand, and for a reasonable charge, furnish a certificate signed 
by an officer of the association setting forth whether the assess-
ments on a specified Lot have been paid. 
Section 8, Effect of Nonpayment of Assessments: Remedies of 
tha Association. Any assessment not paid within thirty (30) days 
after the due date shall bear interest from the due date at the rate 
of cwelve percent (12X) per annum. The Association may bring an 
action at law against the Owner personally obligated to pay the 
same, or foreclose the lien against the property No owner may 
waive or otherwise escape liability for the assessments provided 
for herein by non-uae of the Common Area or abondonment of his Lot. 
Section 9. Subordination of the Lien to Mortgages. The lien 
of the assessments provided for herein shall be subordinate to the 
lien ot any first mortgage. Sale or transfer of any Lot shall not 
affect the assessment lien. However, the sale or transtar of any 
lot pursuant to mortgage foreclosure or any proceeding in lieu 
thereof, shall extinguish the lien of such assessments as to 
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payments whi^h became due p r i o r to such s a l e or t r a n s f e r . No s a l e 
o r t r a n s f e r , s h a l l r e l i e v e such Lot from l i a b i l i t y f o r any a s s e s s m e n t s 
t h e r e a f t e r becoming due o r from th/j l i e n t h e r e o f . 
S e c t i o n 1 0 . Rubbish removal . I t i s agreeded that the a s s o c i a t i o n w i l l 
c o n t r a c t a n n u a l l y t o remove the p e r s o n a l rubbish from a common pick-up area . 
ARTICLE V 
ARCHITECTURAL CONTROL 
No b u i l d i n g , f e n c e , w a l l o r o t h e r s t r u c t u r e s h a l l be commenced, erec ted 
o r maintained upon the P r o p e r t i e s , nor s h a l l any e x t e r i o r a d d i t i o n to o r 
change or a l t e r a t i o n t h e r e i n be made u n t i l the p lans and s p e c i f i c a t i o n s 
showing the g e n e r a l n a t u r e , k i n d , shape , h e i g h t , m a t e r i a l s , and l o c a t i o n of 
the same s h a l l have been submitted to and approver' i n w r i t i n g a s «-o harmony 
of e x t e r n a l d e s i g n and l o c a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to surrounding s t r u c t u r e s and 
topography by the Board of D i r e c t o r s of the A s s o c i a t i o n , o r by an a r c h i t e c t u r a l 
committee composed of three (3 ) o r more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s appointed by the Board. 
In the event s a i d Board, o r i t s d e s i g n a t e d commit tee , f a i l s to approve or 
d isapprove such d e s i g n and l o c a t i o n w i t h i n t h i r t y (30) days a f t e r sa id plans 
and s p e c i f i c a t i o n s have been submit ted to i t , approval w i l l not be required and 
t h i s A r t i c l e w i l l be deemed to have been f u l l y complied w i t h . 
ARTICLE VI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
S e c t i o n I . Enforcement. The A s s o c i a t i o n , o r any Owner, s h a l l 
have the r i g h t t o e n f o r c e , by any proceeding law o r i n e q u i t y , 
a l l r e s t r i c t i o n s , c o n d i t i o n s , c o v e n a n t s , r e s e r v a t i o n s , l i e n s and 
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charges now or hereaf Cer imposed by Che provisions of Chis Declaracion. 
Failure by Che AsaociaCion or by any Owner Co enforce any covenants 
or resCricCion herein contained shall in no evenc be deemed a 
waiver of the righc Co do so chereafCer. 
Section 2. Severability. InvalidaCion of any one of chese 
covenanCs or resCricCions by judgment or uourc order sha.ll in no 
wise affecC any ocher provisions which sh411 remain in full force 
and effect. 
SecCion 3. AmendmenC. The covenanCs and resCrlccions of 
This Declaracion shall run wich and bind Che land, for a Certu of 
cwenCy (20) years from Che daCe this Declaracion is recorded, 
afCer which cinve Chey cha.ll be auComacically exCended for 
successive periods of Cen (10) years. This Declaracion may be 
amended during Che firsC CwenCy (20) year period by an inscrument 
signed by not less Chan nineCy peccenC (90Z) of Che LoC Owners, 
aixl chereaf Cer by an instrument signed by noc less Chan sevenCy-five 
peccenC (757.) of Che LoC Owners. Any amendment mus C be recorded. 
SecCion 4. Annexation. Additional property and Common 
Area may be annexed co Che Properties wiCh Che consent of two-
thirds (2/3) of Che ouCsCanding voces. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, che undersigned, being Che Declarant herein, 
has hereunco set ics hand and *eal chis 15 day of Augusc 19 73 
PTNF MEADOW- RANCH 
DeclaranC ^ 
By. 
Its f>,^f,^//^ 
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STATE OF UTAH 
On the 28th day of September 1973, personally appeared before 
mc W. Brent Jensen, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the 
President of Pine Meadow Ranch and chac said instrunment was signed 
in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws, and said 
W. Brent Jensen acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the 
same. 
&k '7 
Reed D. Pace, Notary Public 
Residing in Summit County 
«* / 
^r; n l 
M : 
. \ - < t 
S; 
* > ; • 
; • • 
< 
vx c \'-
x •/• 
My-Commission Expires: 
Feb ruary lg, 1975 
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Addendum Document "4" -1976 Plat of Pine Meadow Ranch Plat "D." 
STATE OF UTAH,. 
COUNTY OF . W r LJULC 
On lhe__2!e day of_HaJL 
appeared before 
who being by me duly sworn 
the said fiafSPorJ W • D i i t ^ 
AD I 9 0 ± personolly 
IIDM W T\K.Y- ond » ^ y « { W - I V % T T C 
did say , each (or himself , thai he 
_ i s Ihe t iKMhj-President , ond 
the said l W ^ J t L _ S A * l k 6 T i s | » the A>»^. S » < . t t W H 
of_^E«-"-^HYl(Vte Cem>n«*^ .. ond Ihol Ihe wllhin ond 
foregoing instrument was signed In behalf of said corporat ion 
by Ihs authority of a resolution of its board of directors 
ond < n j i * ^ a < k 4 ^ U . D i c V . and UrS»ey ti R A R T H T T E 
; f r j 5 « ^ d & ^ | » d g e d to me thot said corporal ion 
. A D 19 2 3 ! peronol ty 
appeared 
who being by me duly sworn d id soy.eoch for himself 
th» voidttl- B « t N T rCHitrJ i5 the President 
i day of Attd 
before me til. KttHT rr»«t«
 on<j Ml!£j2kauxCj>?**S*« 
(hot he 
ond 
SUBDIV1DERS NOTE 
The recording of this plot shall not constitute o dedicatio 
of roads and streets or rights of way to public. 
It is Mended that oil streets shown he/von shall remain 
the property of the subdivider , Pine Meadow Ranch, and 
Shall be completely maintained by said owner. 
CONTOUR INTERVAL! 
2 5 FT. 
COUNTY A170UK1.V 
S U R V E Y O R S C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, . Ralph. U .Nflr.lhrup . _. do hereby certily that 1 am a F..= .i 
islered Civil Engineer, and or Lend Surveyor, and that I hoi 
ceriiiiccrte No. . _2J47 . a s prescribed under the laws o! trv 
Stale of Utah. I further certify thai by auihority ol ihe Ov/nets, I hav 
made a survey of the frac; of land shov/n on this plat and describe; 
belcw, end have subdivided said Irac! ol lar.d into lots and streets, h*:r 
oiler to be known as._ ._. Pine Meadow Ranch , Rlo|.".D" . . . . . . . . 
end that same lias beer, correctly surveyed ana siaked on the grourn 
as shown on tin's plat. 
COCKSt D!ST. 
] 1 NORTH 1310.74' 
WEST 3640.151 
N.e-30'W. 
N.87*35'44"W. 
S.39*30'W. 
M84'I5'W. 
S.5945'W. 
S0*H'03"E. 
N.76*54'll"E. 
S.79p5e'09't. 
HG7°x}&i. 
se^ia'ae^. 
£72*28'S^E. 
N.83*Wr23"E 
S 65*11" 29"E. 
S8012'52!rEj 
N.78*47,40nE. 
&T7'4Cf3^E 
S.6l«2lr02" E. 
S.89a59,57"E. 
SOUTH 
EAST 
271.33" 
BOWir.AHY uEscKirrro:: 
SE».?Ant:3 
Beginning, at the SE comer of Section 16 . T. 1 N , R 
5.L. B. S M. : Ihence 
556.79' 
_J35_.O.C 
415.23* 
481.59' 
_285.Q2r 
91. 52' 
197.25' 
l.'?..7fc£ 
I73.39T 
226.01' 
186.69' 
346.39' 
172.34' 
223.91' 
336.45' 
_3_60.32j 
154,21 
^300 .4 t f 
1754.14 to Jhe point of beginning , containing 100 00 acrafr,_ 
DATE 
Know all men by these present? Uta'._._. , th^ s undersigned owne; '. 
ol the above described tract ol land, having caused seme JC bs s; i* 
divided into lots and streets lo be hereafter known as the 
PINE MEADOW RANCH . PLAT 
do hereby dedicate fcr perpetual use ol the public ai] parcels ol Jan 
shown on this plat as intended far Pubiic usvi. 
In witness v/hereo! have hereunto set th 
_ . . day of A.D., 19 
PINE MEADOW RANCH 
Wesley Bref t t Jensen 
President 
SECURITY 
_ M 
EXEC We President 
Ze'fla j / Jenseh 
Secretary 
T I T L E CO.,TRUSTEE 
Assf. Sec re ta ry 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 1 „ -
County of Sail Lake J ^ 
_day of_ _A.D., 19 personally appealed be! On the._ 
me, the undersigned Notat7 Public, in and for said County 
in said State ol Utah, the signer? ) of the above Owner's dedicati 
in number, v/ho duly acknowledged to me thai 
signed it freely and voluntarily and for the uses and purposes the; 
mentioned. 
i.fY COMMISSION' r/MRt3: 
PLAT'D'" \'-- LOCATED »\ " 
SECTION IS , T ! U./ri.4±. 
Hr. S 1/2 Ol-
i.AKf. BASK 4 t/W.tvAl! 
. .£.. DArcf5^r.. I 
AD. i*jL{p—... AT v.'tit.>: Ttwt infs syiotvistot: WA.'. AITROVITJ 
AT7D~.-: re am i . aiAim.rAu, B:». c-rcc. coui 
Rr-copprr. J> i , 3 i rfrr 
•:-t*:nv or-S^ 
yC'?. May. ** (3 7.6.. rr.•.!. 
CONTOUR INTERVAL 25' 
NOTE: ALL ROADS HAVE 66FT. R/W 
PINE MEADOW RANO 
PLATED" 
SUMMIT COUNTY 
SHEET 2 0 F 2 
SCALE 1"=100 
X31S&S. 
Addendum Document "5" -1987 Plat of Pine Meadow Ranch Plat "E." 
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Addendum Document "6" -1987 Plat of Pine Meadow Ranch Plat "F." 

S 67' 30 
A/ 7?'S£\ 
soorts 
OCCUPANCY RESTRICTION 
SUMMIT COUNTY HAS AN ORDINANCE Wl 
RESTRICTS THE OCCUPANCY OF BUILDINGS 
Ml THIN THIS DEVELOPMENT. 
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS UHLAWFUL TO OCCUPY 
A BUILDING LOCATED WITHIN THIS 
DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT FIRST HAVING 
OBTAINED A CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY 
ISSUEO 8Y THE BUILDING INSPECTOR. 
ADORES? Of ttANAOIffli QMtfg: 
PINE MEADOW RANCH HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION 
P.O. BOX 17693 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8*117 
'. Sa'OOOO'S. /344 4Z 
jJ-47'W£ . 320.01, 
PLAT F* 
5 H E £ T 2°J2 
P/N6 MfcftOonvJ t\*\MCH -'$••"• 
Addendum Document "7" -1987 Plat of Pine Meadow Ranch Plat "G." 

MATCH TO sweer A 
A 
/**r w 
S Z/'J7'7S" *t< 
J. JS'7?'/J' Hf 
S /aaSS'J7'£. 
s. *9'is-ea's. A/&&*4a'as"£. 
3. Z'Z9WH< 
S. /VS7£V'£. 
7/7. 77' 
zz0.as' /SV.34 
730.00 
776.09 
Zf*. 79 ' 
ZiSSiS' 
OCCUPANCY RESTR:I riON 
SUMMIT COUNTY HAS AN ORDINANCE 
RESTRICTS THE OCCUPANCY '<f BUI 
WITHIN THIS DEVELOPMENT. 
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS UNLAWFUL TO 
A BUILDING LOCATEO WITHIN THIS 
DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT FIRST HAV1 
OBTAINED A CERTIFICATE OF OCCU 
ISSUEO BY THE BUILDING INSPECT 
AOPR.f.55 Of MANAGING OWES: 
PINE MEADOW RANCH HOMEOIWcRS 
ASSOCIATION 
P.O. BOX 17698 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH B4II7 
PLAT G 
SHE.&T Z°$3 
to 
r 
****** *\ 
Addendum Document "8" -1987 Plat of Pine Meadow Ranch Plat "I." 

Addendum Document "9" - 1977 Deed from Security Title to Mountainland Properties. 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
(CORPORATE FORM) 
SECURITY TITl .K COMPANY, Trustee, a corporation organized and existing under the 
laws of the State of Utah , with its principal office at Salt Lake City, of County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, grantor, hereby CONVKYS AND WARRANTS against all claiming by, through 
or under it to 
MOUNTA INLAND PROPERTIES, INC. 
of S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable considerations 
the following described tract of land in Summit 
State of Utah: 
grantee 
County, 
Lots 6, 
•Lot 19, 
Lot 24, 
95 , and 96 , PINE HEADOW RANCH, PLAT "D" 
PINE KEADOW RANCH, PLAT "CM 
PINE MEADOW RANCH, PLAT "B" 
A l s o : BECINNINC a t a p o i n t 137.1.84 f e e t North and 852.32 f e e t West 
from the S o u t h e a s t co rne r of S e c t i o n 16, Township 1 Nor th , Range A 
E a s t , S a l t Lake Base and M e r i d i a n , and running thence West 852 .32 
f e e t ; t hence North 511.1 f e e t ; thence Eas t 852.32 f e e t ; thence South 
511 .1 f e e t to t he p o i n t of BECINNINC. 
SUBJECT TO e a s e m e n t s , r e s t r i c t i o n s , r e s e r v a t i o n s , c o v e n a n t s and r i g h t s 
of way a p p e a r i n g of record and Cenera-1- p r o p e r t y to 'ceo. 
1 fc»ryNa UaUS. i . 5«i ..r?X.?.Z... 
<ft~ \ "*•;'- f ^Uc^^iJ^ ...-iX-Jr?;. . 
J - ^ y V.'ANu* * J,»<.?.W1Ji;v«'JH.' . ; i ,; . ; . . . . 
: 3 * "• s^-^.7/X-^ 
j wja-.ta AS?r.v»..sr /_../ <s ' \ 
••- "••The*officers"wKo""s1gn this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented 
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the 
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto 
affixed by its duly authorized officers this 12th day of J u l y , A.D., 10 77 
~> ) 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, Trustee Attest-/ /.•;• 
. . . ^ 
L. R. WIGHT 
•" * '• * / (C:OK>OR/\TE SF..U.) 
Secretary. 
President. 
;S.TATEOFUTAl;L 
:
. * r - . : '"' 
* .Cott n'ty; o7 Sa 11 Lake 
' ' • •On. . the " * 12ch day of J u l y ,A.O. 1977 
'personally appeared before mc LEO D. JENSEN and L. R. WRIGHT 
who bein£ by mc duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said LEO D. JENSEN 
is the Vice President, and she, the said L. K. WRIGHT i s , n c Secretary 
of SKCUK1TY T I T L E COMPANY, Trustee, and that the within and foregoing instrument 
was.,.signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its Hoard of Directors 
and.;',riul. LEO D. JENSEN and L. R. WRIGHT 
each dul)- acknowledged to mc that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed 
;.s l!n\ .-.cal of said corporation. y* ^ 
.J;Ut£.T.r>^...L<^ 
Notary Public. 
c>:pi res ,Wi-.7H.. ..My residence is Salt Lake City, Utal 
Addendum Document "10" - Certificate of Dissolution of PMRI on December 31,1979. 
0 7-0 1-148 <WE . / 7 7 ) 
Cy VUXAS aL c^ot. o a^vnoAy/ c) ccoeta/LU/ ai/ c) taU/ 
CERTIFICATE OF INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION 
OF 
PINE^NEAUOW RANCH, INC. 
#060608 
/, DAVID S. MONSON, Lt. Governor/Secretary of State of the State of 
Utah, and by virtue of the authority vested in me by law, according to the 
provisions of Section 16-10-88.5 of the Utah Business Corporation Act, hereby 
issue this Certificate of Invohmtary Dissolution. 
G60608 
PINE MEADOW RANCH, INC. 
DOUG SMITH 
613 1 ST AVE. 
SLC, LTAH 
84103 
S/T 
060608 
PlUE MEADOW RANCH, INC . 
W. BRENT JENSEN PRES 
P.O. BOX 274 
WOODS CROSS UTAH 
84C67 
FAILURE TO FILE ANNUAL REPORT 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have 
hereunto set my hand and affixed the 
Great Seal of the State of Utah at Salt 
Lake City, this 31st clay of 
December A.D. 19, 79 
^JS?k 
LT . G O V E R N O R / S E C R E T A R Y O F S T A T E 
y ft 
A U T H O R I Z E D F^ERSON 
Addendum Document "11" -1980 Deed from Mountainland Properties to Ryan. 
Recorded at Request of 
at , M. Fee Paid $„ 
by- .Dep. Book- . P a g e .Ref.: 
Mail tax notice to_ .Address^ 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
[CORPORATE FORM] 
MOUNTAINLANO PROPERTIES, INC. , a corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with Its principal office at 
S a l t Lake C i t y , of County of S | l t Lake , State of Utah," 
grantor, hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS against all claiming by, through or under it to 
J o h n F . Ryan , a m a r r i e d man 
of S a l t Lake C i t y , U tah 
Ten d o l l a r s and n o / 1 0 0 - -
the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah: 
grantee 
for the sum of 
__ DOLLARS 
County, 
Pine Meadow Ranch Plat "D", Lot 6 according to the plat thereof as 
recorded in the office of the Summit County recorder's office. 
SUBJECT TO easements, covenants, restrictions, rights of way and 
reservations appearing of record and taxes for the year 1980 and 
therafter. j — f-frn—Hf> 
Enfry No i i i y ^ . ™ ' BooV Z232jt> 3 
R£ccJ!»)rr)...a.-r.:«i ^JCMIM r ^ z s a J 
RE?' '-"r,«v^Aak.^.'.Uu J T 
T<* WANOA Y. s^;GCi. SUMMIT cp. KCORO 
•NOlXf 0 AWTRACT / ' * ' " 
R CK 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented 
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the 
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to 1* hereunto affixed 
by its duly authorized officers this 4 t h day of A u g u s t , A . D . 19 80 
MOUNTAINLAND PROPERTIES, INC. 
By 
J^,,ASrtti^&^j(? 
. C w r b ^ s g i K . ' S ' President. 
S'TATE^Otf J3TAIL j 
County, of 'J ..*V » / 
On^hc. " 4 t h day of A u g u s t , 1980 
personally appeared before me B r e n t S u t h e r l a n d 
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said S . 
is the V i c e president, andAc, the said M a r l y s J . Rangen 
of M o u n t a i n l a n d P r o p e r t i e s , I n c . , and that the within and foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority, of a resolution of its board of 
directors and said S . B r e n t S u t h e r l a n d Rnd M a r l v s J . .Rangen 
•each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed tho.-^n^e.and.Vhat the seal affixed 
is the seal of said corporation.- * '* l *' ••'- '-
.A. D. 
Marlys J. Rangen 
B r e n t S u t h e r l a n d 
is the secretary 
C ftv.;$oSjf WJLLM 
My commission expires-
-m -My residence ls_ ^(uj< 
LO 
<3 
CP 
o 
Addendum Document "12" - 1984 Deed from Ryan to Mountainland Properties, 
Recorded a: Request of 
at . M, Fee P*id $ 
Mail tsuc notice to „—.. 
MO^.TACN PROPERTIES 
1 J Ashton Avenue 
_SiijLcJ^ke-OJL>u..lJ£aiL.JaAlQ£-
I>.p. Booh Page... 
Address-... 
. Ref.r. 
RYAN WARRANTY DEED 
JOHN/AND WALLEEN RYAN , a l s o knovu as JOHN F. RYAN and 
WALL E EN' W. RYAN 
of SALT LAKE. CITY County cf S A L T L A K E 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
grantor 
State of Utah, hereby 
HOUNTAINLAND PROPERTIES, I N C . 
0f SALT LAKE CITY County SALT LAKE 
forthciumof TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD CONSIDERATION-
grantee 
, Static of Utah 
DOLLARS 
the followini described tract of Uod la 
State of Utah, to-wit: 
SUMMIT County, 
PINE MEADOW RANCH PLAT D, LOT 6 accord ing to che o f f i c i a l p lac as 
reco rded in Che o f f i c e of che r e c o r d e r of s a i d councy . 
Envy No. £26099 . 
secuPjTYTragco. REQUEST Of 
FE5 . , -
*±">./f a By %A^^^J-
RECORDED ^Lr-^r.- .<g£-. r-x J 4 - f # 
,u* 3l8r,:r770 
H. 
WITNESS :he hand of aid grxneor
 t tfaii c > ^ 4 day of 
Signed la the presence of X.„..^X-^^.-.A~.V-\ -M ^*—-^  
JOHfl 
_ .^^C^^^fJr^ri... 
WALLEEN W. RYAN 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF " S * J ^ t £LQ-{ { ss. •f*::--#' 
On the 25+ day of O rfb^^SSM^J7^ personally 
appeared before me JOHN RYA^V'^^^X^rraTAN^alJo known as 
JOHN F. RYAN and WALLEEN&WiAtt"'*»*"/,,, ':. s£ ; 
the «gncrs of the within imrxuror^K^bo.duly iKkndjrltfecd - £j 
My Commission Expires;, 
to me that thsy executed rf^e sjtn^/^P-' J
 v .. *
N
 \ V- ^ 
Notary Public % '^fp'o- ° .-*\^ ^ \ < 
T>t»» o t io r«iwr*o c«r<ciALX.y ron PHOTO-ncca not MO. u»* BLACK I N * AMO rrr*. 
Addendum Document "13" - 1985 Deed from Mountainland Properties to Blanchard. 
I I 
RAYMOND R. BLANCHARD 
398 East Vine Street 
Recorded at Request nf Murray. l?rah 84107 
at_ _ M. Fee Paid $_ 
by- _Dep. Book__ , Pa?R. .Ref. 
Mail Ux notice >* RAYMOND R. BLANCHARD AHHfM 398 East Vine S t . , Hurray, Utah 84107 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
(CORPORATE FORM] 
MOUNTAINLAND PROPERTIES, INC. , a corporate ;n 
organized and existing; under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at 
SALT LAKE C I T r
 § o f C o u n t y o ( SALT LA£E f s u t e of UUh, 
grantor, hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS ag-ainat alt claiming by, throusrh or under It to 
RAYMOND R. BLANCHARD 
dba BLANCHARD ENGINEERING grantee 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS 
County, 
of SALT LAKE CITY 
TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD & VALUABLE CONSIDERATION--
the following described tract of land in SUMMIT 
State of UUh: 
PINE MEADOW RANCH PLAT D, Lot 6 a c c o r d i n g Co t h e o f f i c i a l p l a t 
as r e c o r d e d i n t h e o f f i c e of the r e c o r d e r of Summit County. 
\ Emry NO.- 2 3 2 2 G 4 - r. 
ALAN SWIOGS. SUM-ViT CC R^O.^1^ \ 
The officera who aigm this deed hereby certify that thia detd and the tranafer represented 
thereby waa duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted b^-^he board of directora of the 
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorumr* * 
In witneaa whereof, the grantor Jtaa ^auaed ita corporate name and aeal to be hereunto affixed 
by ita duly authorized officera thia ^ r icfi day of O c t o b e r A. D. 18 84 
Attest: ^ 
(y SecraUry. 
MOUNTAINLAND PROPERTIES, INC. 
\Au 
Prcaident. 
ooor 3 3 6 P W 4 6 4 . 
O c t o b e r 
[CORPORATE SEAL] 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of 
On the 2 5 c h day of 
personally appeared before me T. M c N e i l and 
who being- by me duly aworn did aay, each for himself, that he, the 
» the president, and he, the said T y l e r McNei l x< !i [ ? ^ ' i tyi aecr^ar/i £ 
of M o u n t a i n l a n d P r o p e r t i e s , I n c . , and that'^Vwftnjrtadi^r^oM^:.^ 
instrument waa signed in behalf of aaid corporation by authority of absolution ot ita" 6&ff <tf.&: / 
directora and said T y l e r M c N e i l and C. M i c ^ a e l - . N i ' e l s e n . . .
 i t.;.-* ,V.^/ 
each duly acknowledged to me that aaid corporation executed the aama'i^ nd that'the M a j ' ^ f l ^ e ^ ' 
ia the aeal of aaid corporation. 
My comraiaaion expirna. 
1 1 - 1 6 - 8 6 
_My reaid 
S '.- ',?& v^ JhfqCiry;; Public. 
SAl t '*Tiake^^; ' V ^ 
ence la -., ; •• • *••''>>• 
O 4<M PT\. CO. • t a n to. ]•<><, t»»T • »*CT L»4« €11 
Addendum Document "14" - 1999 Deed from Blanchard to Plaintiff Peters. 
_Paul H. Pe ters 
Space Above This Line for Recorder's Use 
Order No. : 15741 I 
WARRANTY DEED 
Raymond R. Blanchard 
of S a l t Lake C i t y 
CONVEY S and WARRANT S to Paul H. Pe ters 
State of Utah 
grantor 
hereby 
grantee 
of Park City County Summit State of f t a h 
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration, the following described tract of land in 
Summit County, State of Utah to-wic 
ALL OF LOT 6, PINE MEADOW RANCH, PLAT "D", ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT 
THEREOF, ON FILE AND OF RECORD IN THE OFFICE OF THE SUMMIT COUNTY RECORDER. 
Subject to easements, covenants restrictions, rights of way and reservations 
appearing of record and, taxes for the year 1999 , and each year thereafter. 
ti U
0 0 5 2 3 1 1 2 BK01222 PGQG335-Q0335 
ALAN SPRIGGS* SUHHIT CO RECORDER 
1??? JAN 20 K:5? P« FEE ilO.OQ BY DHG 
REQUESTS FIRST AHERICAN TITLE CO UTAH 
CL 
m 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this 19 th day of January 
Signed in the presence of 
STATE OF Utah 
COUNTY OF Summit 
On the 19 th day of January 
Blanchard 
<SS. 
AX). 1999 personally appeared before me Raymond R. 
the signer of the within instrument who duly acknowledged tame that—he executed the same. 
IT s<tt^ N o t a fyP u b , i c * 
^—^ BECKY K. PHILLIPS , 
t745SidowtclBf Or«v« 1 
Par* City. Utah 84Q60 . 
My r.omniisr.icr» Empires | 
_ November 22.2001 
My Coi 
'. Phillips 
Expires: November 22, 2001 
Addendum Document "15" - The Trial Court's Ruling and Order of March 22,2004, in 
The Companion Case, Forest Meadows, etc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FOREST MEADOW RANCH PROPERTY 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, LLC, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
PINE MEADOW RANCH HOME 
ASSOCIATION et.al., 
Respondents. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 000 60.0092 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: March 22, 2004 
The above matter came before the court on March 15, 2004, 
for oral argument on Petitioner's and Respondents' cross motions 
for summary judgment and petitioner's motion to strike. 
Plaintiff was present through Boyd Kimball Dyer, and Defendant 
was present through Edwin C. Barnes. 
BACKGROUND 
Petitioner originally-sought summary relief to nullify 
wrongful liens. The liens arise as a result of Petitioner's 
alleged failure to pay association fees to Respondent and 
Respondent's filing of a lien against Petitioner's property based 
on such failure to pay fees. 
Petitioner is a record interest holder in lot 105A Forest 
Meadow Ranch Plat "D" (Lot 105A-D), which was originally part of 
Lot 105 that has been subdivided into approximately 500 lots. 
In 1965, Security Title Company (Security) as "Trustee" not 
named on the warranty deed received by that warranty deed several 
square miles of real property from F.E. Bates and Mae P. Bates. 
That land was later subdivided and became the Forest Meadow 
subdivision and Pine Meadow subdivision. Security Title was 
listed on the deed as "Trustee" and no beneficiary was named. 
On March 10, 1971, Deseret created its Articles of 
Incorporation, signed by W. Brent Jensen (Jensen), and those were 
filed with the Secretary of State on March 18, 1971. On July 8, 
1971, the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions 
(CCRs) was signed by Jensen. On July 22, 1971, Jensen filed and 
recorded, on behalf of Deseret Diversified Development for Forest 
Meadow Ranch the CC&R' s for southern part of the subdivision 
(Forest Meadow CC&R's). The CCRs provided that Deseret was the 
00368 
owner of the land and the Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners 
Association and assigns would administer and enforce the CCRs. 
The Forest Meadow CCRs further stated: 
The reservations and restrictive covenants herein set 
out are to run with the land and shall be binding upon 
all persons owning or occupying any lot, parcel or 
portion of the real property enumerated at the 
beginning hereof until January 1, 1990, and for 
successive twenty (20) year periods unless within six 
(6) months of the end of the initial period or any 
twenty (20) year period thereafter a written agreement 
executed by the then record owners of more than three-
quarters (3/4) in area of said real property included 
herein is recorded with the Summit County Recorder . . 
There was no reference to association assessments in the 
Forest Meadow CCRs. On July 20, 1971, plat D was signed by 
Deseret and Security as owners, and on August 9, 1972, that 
Forest Meadow Ranch plat was recorded (plat). The plat was 
signed by Deseret Development by Jensen, President; Lee Ann 
Hunter, secretary of Deseret; and by two Security Title Compan 
employees as Trustees. The plat stated: 
Know all men by these presents that we, the four 
undersigned owners of the above described tract of 
land, having caused the same to be subdivided into lots 
& streets hereafter to be known as: FOREST MEADOW 
RANCH, PLAT MD" do hereby dedicate for perpetual use of 
the public all parcels of land shown on this plat as 
intended for public use. 
The plat further stated under the SUBDIVIDERS NOTE: 
The recording of this plat shall not constitute a 
dedication of roads and street or rights of way to 
public use. It is intended.that all streets shown 
hereon shall remain the property of the subdivider, 
Deseret Diversified Development, Inc. - and shall be 
completely maintained-by said owners. 
Forest Meadow Ranch Landowners Association (Petitioner) w 
formed as the homeowners association for the Forest Meadow 
subdivision. Lot 105A-D is partly within the North half of 
Section 22, Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian and partly in the South half of said section. 
0036 ri 
owner of the land and the Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners 
Association and assigns would administer and enforce the CCRs. 
The Forest Meadow CCRs further stated: 
The reservations and restrictive covenants herein set 
out are to run with the land and shall be binding upon 
all persons owning or occupying any lot, parcel or 
portion of the real property enumerated at t h e _ 
beginning hereof until January 1, 1990, and for 
successive twenty (20) year periods unless within six 
(6) months of the end of the initial period or any 
twenty (20) year period thereafter a written agreement 
executed by the then record owners of more than three-
quarters (3/4) in area of said real property included 
herein is recorded with the Summit County Recorder . . 
There was no reference to association assessments in the 
Forest Meadow CCRs. On July 20, 1971, plat D was signed by 
Deseret and Security as owners, and on August 9, 1972, that 
Forest Meadow Ranch plat was recorded (plat). The plat was 
signed by Deseret Development by Jensen, President; Lee Ann 
Hunter, secretary of Deseret; and by two Security Title Company 
employees as Trustees. The plat stated: 
Know all men by these presents that we, the four 
undersigned owners of the above described tract of 
land, having caused the same to be subdivided into lots 
& streets hereafter to be known as: FOREST MEADOW 
RANCH, PLAT "D" do hereby dedicate for perpetual use of 
the public all parcels of land shown on this plat as 
intended for public use. 
The plat further stated under the SUBDIVIDERS NOTE: 
The recording of this plat shall not constitute a 
dedication of roads and street or rights of way to 
public use. It is intended, that all streets shown 
hereon shall remain the property of the subdivider, 
Deseret Diversified Development, Inc. - and shall be 
completely maintained.-by said owners. 
Forest Meadow Ranch Landowners Association (Petitioner) was 
formed as the homeowners association for the Forest Meadow 
subdivision. Lot 105A-D is partly within the North half of 
Section 22, Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian and partly in the South half of said section. 
0036 ri 
On August 14, 1973, Jensen and Vincent B. Tolman created the 
Pine Meadow Ranch Homeowners Association to act as the homeowners 
association for the Pine Meadow Subdivision (Pine Meadows 
Association). 
On September 28, 1973, Jensen on behalf of Pine Meadows 
Association recorded CCRs for the northern part of the 
subdivision in the name of Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. ...CEMRI CCRs) . 
The PMRI CCRs state: 
[A] 11 of the properties described above shall be held, 
sold and conveyed subject to the following easements, 
restrictions, covenants, and conditions, which are for 
the purpose of protecting the value and desirability 
of, and which shall run with, the real property and be 
binding on all parties having any right, title or 
interest in the described properties or any part 
thereof, their heirs, successors and assigns, and shall 
inure to the benefit of each owner thereof. 
The PMRI CCRs provided the rights of the Pine Meadows 
Association, which include right to make assessments, lot owners 
personal obligation to pay assessments and Respondent's ability 
to impose liens against the property for failure to pay such 
assessments. 
Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions have always 
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Jensen Investment. Title conveyed was "subject to easements, 
restrictions and rights of way appearing of record or enforceable 
in law and equity and taxes for the year 1975 and thereafter." 
On January 16, 1975, a deed was recorded from Jensen 
Investment conveying the east half of lot 105A-D to Clifton Emmet 
Clark and Sharon M. Clark (Clarks) by quitclaim deed. That same 
day, another entry was made relating to the east half of Lot 
105A-D, a conveyance by Jensen Investment to the Clarks of the 
same portion by warranty deed. On July 23, 1975, the Clarks 
reconveyed by quitclaim deed the east half of Lot 105A-D back to 
Jensen Investment. 
On July 22, 1975, recorded on July 23, 1975, Jensen 
Investment conveyed by warranty deed Lot 105A-D to Harold E. 
Waldhouse and Maylene C. Waldhouse (Waldhouses). 
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Respondent claims that Pine Meadow Association and Forest 
Meadow Association merged by majority shareholder vote on May 30, 
1978 (the Association or Respondent). Petitioner disputes such 
merger occurred because there are no certified copies of the 
Articles of Merger from the Utah Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code. That dispute is not necessary to resolve in 
this case. 
Respondent claims that the record chain title owner at the 
time of the merger, Clifton Emmet Clark and Sharon M. Clark 
(Clarks), voted in favor of and supported the merger of the 
Associations. Petitioner disputes this arguing that the Clarks 
no longer owned the property at the time of the merger. 
On December 12, 1988, recorded on December 13, 1988, the 
Waldhouses conveyed by warranty deed title to 105A-D to Shelley 
J. Oakason a/k/a Shelley J. Liftos (Oakason) reserving oil, gas, 
and mineral rights. 
On October 29, 1998, a warranty deed dated October 15, 1998, 
was recorded conveying title from Oakason to Axel Grabowski 
(Grabowski). Grabowski took title "[s]ubject to easements, 
restrictions and rights of way appearing of record. . . ." 
On December 9, 1999, Grabowski conveyed title to Lot 105A-D 
to Petitioner herein by quitclaim deed, which was recorded on 
December 10, 1999. The named petitioner herein is made up only of 
Grabowski. 
Since the alleged merger, the Association has operated as 
the homeowners' association for the 800 plus lots, homes and 
cabins in the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow Subdivisions. Lot 
ownership has been the basis for membership in the Association, 
including assessments and notice of and the right to vote at the 
Association's annual meetings. The Association has assessed lots 
to pay for its operations and has received payment of assessments 
from lot owners. Respondent claims that the primary 
responsibility of the Association is to own, maintain and insure 
the road system in the Pine Meadow Ranch area for the benefit of 
all the Association's members and their invitees. Petitioner 
disputes this and claims that the roads are owned by the lot 
owners. (Even if the roads are owned by the lot owners, the 
issues here relate to whether the CCRs reflected the 
Association's duty to own, maintain and insure the road system.) 
The Association also owns, maintains and insures a 
substantial amount of open space for the benefit of its members. 
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In October 1985, the Summit County Commission determined to 
establish the Pine Meadow Special Service District (the "SSD") 
for the provision of water service and the maintenance of 
roadways in the Pine Meadow areas for the benefit of the lot 
owners. Predecessor owners of Forest Meadow Lot 105 paid taxes 
to and received benefits from the SSD. The SSD was dissolved by 
vote of the Summit County Commission in the spring of 2000. On 
March 20, 2000, the SSD executed a "Deed of Easements conveying 
to the Association, an easement for the operation and maintenance 
of "public roads connecting such roads and ways to the Pine 
Meadow and Forest Meadow Subdivisions, including the road known 
as Tollgate Canyon Road." "In Pine Meadow Ranch Owners 
Association, Inc. v. Summit County, Utah Third District Court, 
Summit County, case no. 6181, the Court concluded that the roads 
within Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions are private 
roads, not public. 
Since the conveyance from the SSD, the Association has 
maintained, improved and insured the roadways in the Pine Meadow 
and Forest Meadow subdivisions and has continued to own and 
insure open space, and to extend power lines and provide other 
benefits for its members. The Association has continued to 
assess and receive payment for fees. The Association has spent 
hundreds of thousands of dollars and currently has an annual 
budget of $140,000. 
On July 25, 1980, the Association republished the Forest 
Meadow and PMRI CCRs in the form of a "Notice of Lien" (Lien 
Notice). Petitioner disputes that the CCRs were merely to 
confirm public notice of the CCRs, rather it expands the powers 
of Respondent to make assessments. Since recording the Lien 
Notice, the Association has continued to collect its assessments 
and perform its other functions. 
In 2003, the Association recorded a "Clarification of Notice 
of Lien" (Clarification) confirming that the Lien Notice was 
intended merely to republish the existing CCRs and other 
encumbrances of record and not to create any new charge or 
encumbrance on any property. Petitioner disputes that the 
Clarification clarifies anything. Petitioner claims that the 
Clarification is a new wrongful lien because by its terms it 
makes a claim that Respondent has title to the roadways in 
disregard of the rights of the lot owners who have record title 
to the roads. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On March 6, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition to nullify 
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wrongful liens against the Association with regard to the Notice 
Lien. On March 20, 2000, the court heard oral arguments on the 
sufficiency of the petition and affidavit under the Utah wrongful 
lien statute. On March 27, 2000, the court ruled that 
Petitioner's petition for summary relief be denied because if 
Petitioner's claim was correct, then approximately 500 lots may 
be similarly situated as Petitioner's lot 105A-D and the relief 
requested exceeded the remedy of a summary proceeding because 
Petitioner sought damages. The court entered- an Order on this 
Ruling on May 18, 2000, and sua sponte granted Petitioner leave 
to amend as a non summary proceeding within thirty days. 
On May 17, 2000, Petitioner filed an amendment to Petition 
for Summary Relief to Nullify Wrongful Lien pursuant to the Utah 
wrongful lien statute, Utah Code § 38-9-1 et seq. modifying 
Petitioner's prayer for relief to limit the petition to: (1) the 
issue of whether the 1980 Notice Lien is a "wrongful lien" as 
defined by the Utah Wrongful Line Statute and (2) if the court 
finds it to be a wrongful lien, the issue of what relief is in 
accordance with the facts and the law. Petitioner requested that 
the court permit discovery limited to those issues and upon 
completion of discovery the court hold a non-summary hearing on 
those issues. Petitioner seeks a declaration that the CCRs 
recorded in 1971 and 1973 are void and petitioner should not be 
required to pay any assessments. 
The parties engaged in discovery. 
On October 14, 2003, Petitioner filed its motion for summary 
judgment. 
On December 10, 2003, Respondent filed its cross motion for 
summary judgment and opposition to Petitioner's motion for 
summary judgment. 
On December 16, 2003, Petitioner filed its reply memoranda 
in support of its motion for summary judgment. That same day, 
Petitioner filed a motion to strike Respondent's cross motion for 
summary judgment and opposition to Petitioner's motion for 
summary judgment because it failed to comply with former Utah R. 
Jud. Adm. 4-501 (now known as Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)). 
Specifically, Petitioner argued that Respondent's memoranda 
failed to comply with the motion practice rule because it 
combined its cross motion for summary judgment with its 
opposition to Petitioner's motion. 
On January 5, 2003, Respondent filed its opposition to 
Petitioner's motion to strike. Respondent argued that for the 
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sake of judicial economy and the parties, the court should allow 
Respondent to respond in a combined memoranda. 
On January 7, 2004, Petitioner filed its reply memorandum in 
support of its motion to strike. 
LAW 
When both parties move for summary judgment, the court is 
not bound to grant it to one side or another. Diamond T. Utah, 
Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 441 P.2d 705 (1968). Cross motions 
for summary judgment do not warrant the court's granting of 
summary judgment unless one of the moving parties is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law upon facts that are not genuinely 
disputed. Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Assocs. , 635 P.2d 53 
(Utah 1981) . 
Cross motions may be viewed as involving a contention by 
each movant that no genuine issues of material fact exists under 
the theory it advances, but not as a concession that no dispute 
remains under the theory advanced by its adversary. Nycalis v. 
Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); cert, denied, 
789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). In effect, each cross movant implicitly 
contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but 
that if the court determines otherwise, factual disputes exist 
that preclude judgment as a matter of law in favor of the other 
side. Id. 
The court has discretion to decide whether to allow 
memoranda not in conformance with the rules. 
Section 57-3-103 (2000) of the Utah Recording Act provides: 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is 
void as against any subsequent purchaser of the same 
property, or any portion of it, if: (1) the subsequent 
purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for 
a valuable consideration, and (2) the subsequent 
purchaser's document is first recorded. 
Section 57-4a-4 provides: 
A recorded document creates the following presumptions 
regarding title to the real property affected: . . . 
.(e) any necessary consideration was given; (f) the 
grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest 
created or described in the document acted in good 
faith at all relevant times; . . . . 
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Covenants that run with the land must have the following 
characteristics: (1) the covenant must touch and concern the 
land; (2) the covenanting parties must intend the covenant to run 
with the land; and (3) there must be privity of estate. Flying 
Diamond Oil Corporation v. Newton Sheep Company, 77 6 P.2d 618, 
622-23 (Utah 1989). However, the law of covenant running with 
the land has long been a source of some confusion. Id. "For a 
covenant to run in equity, it must 'touch and concern' the land, 
and there must be an intent that it run. Privity is not 
required, but the successor must have notice of the covenant." 
Id. at 623 n.6. Although the touch and concern and intent 
requirements are somewhat Interrelated, the absence of any one of 
the requirements prevents a covenant from running with the land. 
Id. at 623. 
Not every covenant binds subsequent owners or 
users of the land, even though the covenant purports to 
be a covenant that runs with the land. The effect of 
the touch-and-concern requirement is to restrict the 
types of duties and liabilities that can burden future 
ownership of interests in the land. The touch-and-
concern requirement focuses on the nature of the 
burdens and benefits that a covenant creates. What is 
essential is that the burdens and benefits created must 
relate to the land and the ownership of an interest in 
it; the burdens and benefits created are not the 
personal duties or rights of the parties to a covenant 
that exist independently from the ownership of an 
interest in. the land. . -. . 
[T]o touch and concern the land, a covenant must 
bear upon the use and enjoyment of the land and be of 
the kind that the owner of an estate or interest in 
land may make because"' of his ownership right. 
Id. at 623-24. 
The original parties to the covenant must have intended that 
the covenant run with the land. Id. at 627. The parties intent 
may be determined by an express statement in the document or 
implied by the nature of the covenant itself. Id. At first 
blush, a covenant to pay may appear personal, however, a promise 
to pay may touch and concern the land if its purpose is to 
benefit the covenantor's interest in the land, e.g., the 
establishment of an easement may touch and concern the land, a 
covenant to pay for the use of an easement may be part of a 
covenant running with the land. Id. at 625. 
Privity of estate is also required. Id. at 628. There are 
three types of privity of estate: (1) mutual, e.g., a covenant 
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arising from simultaneous interests in the same land; (2) 
horizontal, e.g., a covenant created in connection with a 
conveyance of an estate from one of the parties to another and 
(3) vertical, e.g., the devolution of an estate burdened or 
benefitted by a covenant from an original covenanting party to a 
successor. Id. "[Vertical privity] arises when the person 
presently claiming the benefit, or being subjected to the burden, 
is a successor to the estate of the original person, .so benefitted 
or burdened." Id. A strict approach to privity has been 
abandoned and substance prevails over technical form, e.g., a 
homeowner's association which had no interest in property at all 
can sue to enforce a covenant. Id. 
Restrictive covenants that run with the land a!nd 
encumber subdivision lots form a contract between 
subdivision property owners as a whole and individual 
lot owners; * therefore, interpretation of the covenants 
is governed by the same rules of construction as those 
used to interpret contracts. 
Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 810-11 (Utah 2000). 
Restrictive covenants are enforceable in equity 
against all those who take the estate with notice of 
them, although they may not be, strictly speaking, real 
covenants so as to run with the land or of a nature to 
create a technical qualification of the title conveyed 
by the deed. The question is not whether the covenant 
runs with the land, but whether a party will be 
permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with 
the contract entered into by his or her vendor, where 
the purchase was made with notice of such covenant. 
The enforcement of restrictive covenants or equitable 
servitudes is based on the principle of notice; that 
is, a person taking title to land with notice of a 
restriction upon it will not, in equity and good 
conscience, be permitted to violate such restriction. . 
Constructive or actual notice of a restrictive 
covenant imposed in furtherance of a building or 
development scheme, on the part of one against whom 
enforcement is sought is essential. Accordingly, 
restrictions on the use of land in a subdivision 
embraced by a general plan of development can be 
enforced against a subsequent purchaser who takes title 
to the land with notice of the restriction. . . . 
A purchaser with notice of restrictive covenants 
upon land is bound by such restrictions, although they 
are not such as in strict legal contemplation run with 
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the land. Thus, even though a covenant does not run 
with the land, it may be enforceable against a 
transferee of the covenantor who takes with knowledge 
of its terms under circumstances which would make it 
inequitable to permit avoidance of the restriction. 
Such a covenant is binding on a purchaser with notice 
not merely because such purchaser stands as an assignee 
of the party who made., the agreement, but becauaa he or 
she has taken the estate with notice of a valid 
agreement concerning it. The enforcement against a 
purchaser with notice rests upon the principle, that it 
would be inequitable to permit such an owner, while 
enjoying the fruits of and claiming under the grant, 
part of the consideration for which was the benefit 
promised by the covenant, to destroy such benefit by 
violating the covenant. -
20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants §§ 266-67(1995). 
ARGUMENTS 
Petitioner argues that Deseret did not have record title to 
Lot 105 at the time it recorded Forest Meadows CCRs to the 
property, therefore, having no recorded deed to the property it 
was unable to bind the lot with CCRs that would run with the 
land. When Deseret recorded the CCRs in 1971, it had notice that 
record title to the land was held by Security. If Deseret wanted 
to bind the lot with covenants running with the land, it knew to 
obtain a deed and record it, but failed to do so. Therefore, 
Petitioner argues that Petitioner's chain of title is superior to 
Respondent's and the CCRs do not apply to Petitioner. Petitioner 
argues that only if Deseret had fee simple title could it bind 
the land with such covenants. Because Deseret had no privity of 
estate, it could not bind the land. Petitioner argues that 
Security was listed as Trustee in the 1965 warranty deed from 
Bates, and because there are no contemporaneous documents showing 
Security was Trustee for Deseret, the court is to disregard the 
word "Trustee" and the court should simply read the 1965 warranty 
deed to be from Bates to Security, who was the fee simple owner 
in 1971 when Jensen and Deseret purported to create the CCRs. 
Petitioner calls this the doctrine of "descriptio personae." 
See, e.g., TWN, Inc., v. Mlchele, 66 P.3d 1031 (Utah App. 2003). 
Petitioner also argues that the 1971 CCRs only covered a 
portion of the development, and that in part is why other CCRs 
were filed in 1973, and that act further indicates that the 1971 
CCRs were not valid. Petitioner also argues that the attempt by 
Respondent to have the court determine who could validly file 
CCRs in 1971 and 1973 should be rejected because the CCRs and 
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plats filed with the recorder do nothing more than give inquiry 
notice that perhaps others, have an interest in the land. 
However, without a deed, Deseret cannot be heard to claim they 
owned the land such that they can bind it with CCRs. 
Respondent argues that Petitioner lacks standing to 
challenge the CCR's because it took title to Lot 105A-D subject 
to easements, restrictions and rights of way appearing of record 
from Grabowski, who received title from Oakson. Furthermore, 
Respondent argues that the Petitioner's'predecessors paid 
association dues and this confirms their acceptance of and 
agreement with the CCR's. Respondent also argues that the Clarks 
voted in favor of and supported the merger of associations. 
Respondent argues that the recording of CCRs does not purport to 
document conveyance of a property interest. Instead the CCRs are 
a contract established by a prior owner which affects property 
and is construed under the principles of contract law that such 
restrictive covenants run with the land and encumber subdivision 
lots form a contract between subdivision property owners as a 
whole and individual lot owners. Moreover, Respondent argues 
that restrictive covenants are enforceable in equity when a 
purchaser has notice of such -covenants at the time of purchase. 
Here, Petitioner had notice of the CCRs and Lien Notice prior to 
receiving its property interest in 105A-D, therefore, it took 
such interest subject to the CCRs. Respondent argues that 
Petitioner has not offered any evidence to overcome the 
presumption that Deseret was owner or developer at the time the 
CCRs were recorded. Respondent argues that the recorded 
subdivision plat confirms that Deseret and Security had mutuality 
of estate and interest in the ownership of Lot 105 which is 
presumed to be true because it is a recorded document and 
Petitioner fails to rebut that presumption. Respondent footnotes 
that if the court grants Petitioner's petition that it will be 
unable to do what it is supposed to by assessing fees and 
maintaining the roads and common areas, therefore, the 
subdivision will collapse and result in anarchy. 
Petitioner replies that under Utah law,, the words "subject 
to easements, restrictions and rights of way currently of record" 
only limit the warranty given in a deed, they do not create any 
interest. Such a phrase does not convey anything to anyone, 
therefore, such phrase does not validate the 1971 CCRs. , Clarks' 
vote on the merger is irrelevant because he did not own Lot 105A-
D at the time of the vote and the merger of the two homeowners' 
associations had nothing to do with the validity of the 1971 CCRs 
and the vote could not convey any interest in real property. 
Petitioner also argues that the CCRs are an interest in real 
property in the nature of an equitable servitude or real 
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covenant, not as Respondent claims, merely a matter of contract. 
Petitioner argues that actual notice is insufficient to validate 
the CCRs, compliance with the Recording Act is required. 
Petitioner also argues that equitable title to land by Deseret 
through Security as Trustee is contrary to Utah law and factually 
impossible because Deseret did not exist at the time that the 
Bates conveyed title to Security. Petitioner argues that the 
only way that Deseret could have acquired any intergjrt in the 
land was by deed or written instrument, and if any such deed or 
instrument ever existed, it is now void because it was not timely 
recorded. Petitioner argues that in order for covenants to bind 
a subsequent purchaser like Petitioner, there must be vertical 
privity of estate between the owner who was originally bound by 
them and the subsequent purchaser. Petitioner argues that the 
CCRs are not binding on Petitioner because there is no vertical 
privity of estate between -Deseret and Petitioner. Petitioner 
asserts that the presumption of UCA 57-41-4 applies to the 
warranty deed also, and it is at odds with the presumption 
concerning the CCRs and so the deed should govern. Finally, 
Petitioner argues that the court should reject Respondent's 
argument that it must be able to make mandatory assessments or 
the subdivisions will collapse because it is the classic 
justification for tyranny. 
DISCUSSION 
1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE. 
CJA 4-501 was repealed effective November 1, 2003, and its 
substance was enacted in URCP Rule 7(c). The court has 
discretion in requiring compliance with the rules formerly and 
even though now enacted in a rule of procedure, the court feels 
the same. Although Rule 7 does not technically provide for an 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment to be filed combined 
with a cross motion for summary judgment, the court agrees with 
defendants that for judicial economy such is a practical 
approach. The court will consider all of the pleadings of the 
parties. 
Therefore, the court DENIES plaintiff's motion to strike. 
2. CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
There appear to be factual disputes about some of those 
issues, but the parties indicate and argue that there are no 
facts to try. In part because of the age of these activities, the 
parties agree that the court should and must decide these issues 
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as a matter of law on the record before it. 
(1) The court concludes that the cases relied on by 
Petitioner do not govern this proceeding. 
Petitioner relies upon TWN,. Inc., v. Michel, supra, 66 P. 3d 
1031, where parties both asserted ownership of a parcel that was 
passed to one party's predecessor in interest by "Riehard A 
Christenson, Trustee" and -the other parcel passed to the other 
party's predecessor in interest by "Richard A. Christensen." The 
issue in TWN was whether a grantor's unexplained placing of the 
word "trustee" next to his or her name on a real property deed 
results, as a matter of law, in conveyance of only a trust 
interest. The court concluded that the "descriptio personae" 
doctrine applied which is when "certain terms sometimes added to 
a person's name [that] are merely descriptive matter intended to 
clarify the identity of the person, but their use or non-use 
should generally play no part in the validity of the conveyance." 
Id. at 1033. The concept of descriptio personae has long been 
recognized to the identification of parties on real property 
deeds. Id. at 1034. The court concluded that the unexplained 
word "trustee" on a real property deed does not, absent other 
circumstances suggesting the creation or existence of a trust, 
create a trust or implicate only a trust interest. Id. The 
Court also noted that UCA § 75-7-402(5) authorizes a trustee to 
dispose of trust property "in the name of the trustee as 
trustee." But something more is-required, e.g., "in my capacity 
as trustee for the XYZ trust," or alternatively a party may 
resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust was iri fact 
intended. 
Here, there is no competing title interests in property. 
There is no dispute that Petitioner is. the record title holder to 
the property. It is undisputed that Petitioner's title traces 
back to Security Title. It is undisputed that Security Title's 
name is on the deed as trustee. However, here, other 
circumstances exist that did not exist in TWN. Specifically, the 
name of the trustee, Security Title, was one that would generally 
be seen as a trustee, not a property owner. A title company 
often holds title to property as trustee. Furthermore, the 
recorded plat map reflected Deseret as the owner of the property 
and Security Title as trustee. The recorded plat map clearly 
reflects Security Title as the trustee of the property and 
Deseret as owners of the property. Moreover, it is undisputed 
that Deseret had recorded CCRs with protective covenants and 
listed Deseret as owner of the land. The court concludes that 
the word "trustee" under the circumstances surrounding this case 
reflected the existence of a trust and that Deseret was the 
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beneficiary and owner of the property. 
Petitioner also relies upon Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower 
Mountain Fonds, 76 P.3d 711 (Utah App. 2003), where the parties 
both asserted ownership of a mining claim through differing 
chains of title. Here, as previously stated there is no 
competing title interest. There is no dispute that Petitioner is 
the record title holder to the property. 
Petitioner also relies upon Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. 
Newton Sheep Company, 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989). In that case, 
the parties conflict involved an agreement regarding the surface 
right of land. The court concluded that the agreement governing 
the surface right of the land created a covenant, which ran with 
the land because it touched and concerned the land, it was the 
intent of the original parties, there was privity of estate, and 
the agreement was in writing. Petitioner argues that here, there 
is no privity of estate. 
The court is not persuaded.. Applying substance over form, 
there is vertical privity of estate. As stated above, under the 
circumstances, it is clear that Security Title was Trustee for 
Deseret. Deseret recorded^the CCRs as owner. Petitioner's 
successor in interest received title from Security Title as 
Trustee for Deseret. Deseret expressly stated that "the 
reservations and restrictive covenants herein set out are to run 
with the land and shall be binding upon all persons owning or 
occupying any lot . . . ." Later, Pine Meadow's CCRs expressly 
stated that "all of the properties . . . shall be held, sold and 
conveyed subject to the following easements, restrictions, 
covenants, and conditions, which are for the purpose of 
protecting the value and desirability of, and which shall run 
with, the real property." Clearly, these covenants touched and 
concerned the land and the express intent was for them to do so. 
Accordingly, as in Flying Diamond, the CCRs run with the land and 
Petitioner is bound by them. 
The basic argument by the Association is that competing 
titles are not involved in those cases, and here title is clear 
in Petitioner, but such title is burdened by the prior recorded 
covenants. 
The court agrees that this fact situation is not one of 
competing titles. The warranty deed of 1965 indeed names 
Security Title as Trustee and it does not name who it is trustee 
for. However, other documents, some executed by Security Title, 
later demonstrate that the CCR's signed by Jensen on behalf of 
Deseret show Security believed it was fee simple owner only for 
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Deseret, even though Deseret did not exist in 1965. Extraneous 
and reasonably contemporaneous evidence shows that Security was 
not the intended owner in fee simple and the word Trustee by its 
name does more than describe Security. It shows Security's 
interest and while it alone does not create a trust interest, 
other evidence and documents show Deseret had an interest in the 
land. Deseret has not attempted to do anything to the land 
inconsistent with its own ownership interest. Security could have 
done the same thing to the land. Deseret does not claim title. 
It merely encumbered the land which it could do as owner. Title 
companies are in the business of holding title in trust for 
someone or some other entity. The CCRs here make clear that 
anyone who buys this land takes it subject to certain 
restrictions, which is again not out of the ordinary. Deseret 
has done more than merely "claim" an interest in the land. That 
claim was verified and confirmed by the trustee Security when it 
signed the plat. 
(2) The court does not accept the "anarchy" argument of 
Respondent, but does believe that because assessments have been 
ongoing for many years, and because Respondent has been 
maintaining roads and open spaces, and because property owners 
have been paying assessments to the SSD and to respondent since 
dissolution of the SSD, Petitioner's claim must fail. Clearly, 
the covenants touch and concern the land. Petitioner's 
predecessors in interest benefitted from those roads and open 
spaces. Petitioner benefits from the work of the Association. It 
is clear that Deseret's intent was for the roads and open spaces 
to benefit the subsequent property owners .of the subdivided 
property. As stated above, vertical privity exists. 
Nevertheless, even if there was no vertical privity, as a matter 
of equity, the court agrees with Respondent that prior 
predecessors in interest have treated the covenants as covenants 
that run with the land and so must Petitioner. A challenge to 
these covenants over thirty years later is untimely and must be 
barred. 
(3) Property law does not fully govern here, but contract 
principles emerge and where Petitioner bought the land with 
notice it did so subject to certain restrictions, Petitioner 
ought to be bound by those restrictions. Prior to subdividing 
the property Deseret recorded the plats and CCRs. The initial 
transfer from Security Title was granted in 1975. This was 
several years after the plats and CCRs were recorded. 
Petitioner's predecessors in ..interest paid the assessments and 
enjoyed the roads and open spaces as a result thereof. 
Petitioner has also had the right to enjoy the roads and open 
spaces. There is no dispute that Petitioner had notice of the 
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restrictions at the time it received the property. Moreover, 
Petitioner took the property by quit claim deed from Grabowski 
who took the property "[s]ubject to easements, restrictions and 
rights of way appearing of record. . . ." For Petitioner now to 
claim that those restrictions should not apply to it is not 
persuasive. The restrictions were recorded long before 
Petitioner obtained title. It would be inequitable to permit 
Petitioner, while enjoying the fruits of such restrictions, to 
not. comply with the restrictions when Petitioner had notice of 
them at the time it obtained -title. 
(4) Petitioner claims ownership of a lot of land conveyed 
by Deseret. At the same time Petitioner claims that CCRs created 
by Deseret do not apply to Petitioner. As discussed in (1), (2) 
and (3), the court does not agree. 
Based on the above, the court DENIES the motion for summary 
judgment of Petitioner and GRANTS the motion of Respondent for 
summary judgment. 
Respondent is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP, 
Rule 7(f) . 
DATED this day of ^w^4 2004. 
BY TH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDm^TnicT^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 000600092 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail EDWIN C BARNES 
ATTORNEY DEF 
201 S MAIN ST 13TH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
84111-2216 
Mail BOYD KIMBALL DYER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
664 NORTHCLIFFE CIRCLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84103 
Dated this 3<?JyJt day of /%frv^<C ', 2 0 0 ^ . 
Page 1 (last) 00382. 
Addendum document *16" -1^80 Notice of Lien. 
When recorded return to: 
Pine Meadow Ranch Association 
1104 Ashton Avenue #203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
;RECX-
•.REQI;:I: 
CEE 
C'O 
..£z£.W> *\]6<'Ou p»<1c7X3 
*A1 ' ' 1 'Vf.&V SUMMIT CO. WK.OJtUtR 1 
>.r>!f.ACT ._ <f H V? 
NOTICE OF LIEN 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That pursuant to that certain document entitled "Reservations 
and Restrictive Covenants, Forest Meadow Ranch" dated July 8, 1971 
and filed for record July 22, 1971 as entry No. 113593, Book No. 
M32 in the office of the County Recorder of Summit County, State 
of Utah and also that certain document entitled "Reservations and 
Protective Covenants, Pine Meadow Ranch", dated August 15, 1973 
and filed for record on September 28, 1973 as entry 120967, Book No. M-50, 
office of the County Recorder of Summit County, State of Utah, 
Pine Meadow Ranch Association, a Utah non-profit corporation, 
claims a continuing lien upon the following described real property 
for the payment of annual maintenance assessment, annual water share 
fees, special maintenance assessments, penalties and interest on any 
or all of said items: 
Plat A, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 81 
Plat B, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 49 
Plat C, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 05 
Plat D, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 104 
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat A, Lots 1 through 14 
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat B, Lots 15 through 39 
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat C, Lots 40 through 06 
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat 0, Lots 86 through 181 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that prior to the sale or conveyance of 
any said real property, a Certificate of Good Standing should be 
obtained therefor from the Pine Meadow Ranch Association, 1104 Ashton 
Avenue, Suite 203, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, indicating that all 
outstanding assessments have been paid in full; otherwise a purchaser 
may be responsible for payment of prior delinquent assessments. 
Dated: 
Pine Meadow Ranch Association 
By: 
'$£& M. 
It'bV President 
-P- «HfW Q ^
 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
•/& 
On the /&"~ 
before me Gerald 
who duly acknowledg 
'~ day of y?££^£— , 1980, personally appeared 
P. Lang ton, the/ sWner of the foregoing instrura^nt, 
ledged to me tha^ t he executed the same. ..••"\i» T. -•/.'•*.• 
/ /?• 9:; /• -<\ 
Notary p u b l i c : "•/ it ~ 
Residing a t : //cCl/-.* 
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